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FOREWORD
The U.S. Army has to adapt to a constantly changing environment. One of the most important changes
in this environment is urbanization—a process that is
occurring rapidly and globally and is resulting in the
advent of much larger cities—of over 10 or in some
cases even 20 million people—as well as the growth of
many more smaller cities. It is also resulting in different kinds of cities, ranging from smart cities, in which
technology is fully integrated, to feral cities characterized by violence and disorder. In between these extremes are fragile cities that can tip in either direction.
This has led to some discussion about the appropriate
focus for the Army, but the authors of this study argue
that the best way forward is to consider both megacities and (what they term) sub-megacities. The authors
also respond to questions that have been raised about
the conditions that might draw the Army into a military operation in a megacity or sub-megacity, identifying six different kinds of strategic considerations
that might lead civilian decision-makers to determine
the need to use military force in response to events,
trends, and developments in a massive urban agglomeration. The authors take the view that although such
a contingency would be a formidable undertaking, a
better understanding of the urban environment and
more effective preparations can enhance the prospects for success. They emphasize the need to understand the city as a complex living organism with its
own flows, networks, and rhythms, and recommend
a multi-level approach to intelligence preparation for
and on the battlefield, ranging from the subterranean
dimension to the cyber- and data-overlay that hovers
above the city. Phil Williams and Werner Selle also
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argue that it is important to minimize the disruption
to the natural flows and rhythms of a city. This is followed by a practical and helpful discussion of how
more selective recruitment, enhanced training, better
equipment, and more effective tactics could enhance
the prospects for success. The authors conclude that
the U.S. Army—through a conceptual understanding
of megacities and sub-megacities; an institutionally
embedded system of intelligence collection and analysis for the urban battlefield; innovations in doctrine,
equipment, and training; and an appreciation of likely
scenarios and adversary actions—can be more prepared for the dense urban battlefield than ever before.
Inherent and unforeseen challenges will remain, but
the prospects for overcoming these challenges will be
significantly enhanced.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Urbanization is one of the most important megatrends of the 21st century. Consequently, the possibility of U.S. military involvement in a megacity or
sub-megacity is an eventuality that cannot be ignored.
After elucidating the nature of urbanization and developing a typology in terms of smart, fragile, and
feral cities, we give consideration to the kinds of contingencies that the U.S. military, especially the
Army, needs to think about and prepare for.
Six kinds of contingencies have since been identified: humanitarian disaster relief; military support for
civilian authorities in a restoration of order; intervention—for whatever reason—in a strategic city (also
termed a critical or alpha city); military involvement
in a city in the context of counter-insurgency; use of
military force in a city in an interstate conflict; and
containment or quarantine of an urban pandemic.
Many debates arise concerning whether the appropriate focus should be predominantly on megacities
or on smaller, but possibly more important, cities or
perhaps on both. If the U.S. Army has the capacity to
intervene militarily in a megacity, then it is likely that
it could do the same in a smaller city. Consequently,
the authors of this monograph focus on megacities
and sub-megacities.
Whatever the contingency, understanding the
city as a complex system or organism is critical and
provides the basis for changes in intelligence, recruitment, training, equipment, operations, and tactics. In this monograph, we place emphasis on intelligence preparation for the battlefield in terms of 10
interconnected layers: the subterranean dimension,
topography, cityscape, service infrastructure, inhabit-
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ants, networks, flows, governance, rhythms, and the
cyber dimension. This is followed by a discussion of
what needs to be done to prepare for operations in
megacities with the “concrete canyons” of modern
business areas and the “sheet metal forests” found in
massive slum areas. Consideration is given to equipment, personnel recruitment and training, the lessons
that can be derived from past military experience as
well as more recent law enforcement practices, and
the need to work with (instead of against) the flows
and rhythms of a city. Without such an approach, the
results of military involvement in such a formidable
environment would likely be disastrous; with it, the
prospects for success would at least be enhanced.
The recommendations include the following:
• Megacities should become a distinct focus of
analysis for intelligence. Cities have to be understood as a layered and interacting series
of complex adaptive systems, outlined with a
more refined intelligence of the battlefield. Operating in these cities requires an understanding of these systems and an ability to harness,
rather than disrupt, their dynamics.
• The development of a repository of knowledge
and understanding of cities is critical, and the
U.S. Army should create both an Urban Analysis Center and a supporting network that provides a surge capability for crisis interventions.
• Greater interagency cooperation that transcends the military services and incorporates
civilian departments and agencies (such as the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other Federal law
enforcement agencies) is essential.
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• U.S. forces will have to interact effectively with
both the formal and informal mechanisms of
governance within megacities and sub-megacities. This may involve cooperating with nontraditional stakeholders, such as criminal elements or other alternative governance actors.
• Conducting operations in megacities, as well as
other urban areas, will require highly trained,
quality personnel. The armed services will
have to increase incentives to draw talented individuals to serve. It will also be necessary to
incorporate recruits and affiliates with broader
skill sets, especially those required for urban
management and urban law enforcement.
These initiatives should be complemented
by in-house training for professional soldiers
to prepare them more effectively for the demands of operating in these complex urban
environments.
• Governments should recognize that there are
synergies—and important economies of scale—
between the skill sets required for operating in
dense urban areas and those appropriate for
stabilization operations.
• Finally, this monograph proposes two broad
checklist-based acronyms, URBAN and
SMART, which encapsulate many of the arguments and themes articulated in the preceding
analysis. To fight effectively in a dense urban
environment, the U.S. Army will have to meet
the following requirements and approaches:
• Understanding the megacity battlefield.
• Responding appropriately to the stringent
demands of the urban battlefield.
• Battle management that is accommodating
to the city’s rhythms, flows, and networks.
xiii

• Alliances that will go beyond government
agencies and their usual partners.
• Novel approaches that are essential to creating the smart urban soldier.
Moreover, within this urban approach, the smart soldier would exhibit the following qualities:
• Sophisticated understanding of the urban
battlefield.
• Multimedia and social media awareness.
• Ability to act as intelligence collectors and
receivers.
• Rapid responses both within the command
system and in decentralized operations.
• Technological knowledge and expertise.
Ultimately, fighting smart in an urban environment
is the only feasible approach. This monograph offers
some preliminary considerations of what this might
mean, but, raises more questions than it answers. It
is no more than an early—but hopefully useful—contribution to a debate that needs to be both broadened
and refined. Only after such a debate will the United
States be ready for future contingencies that are likely
to be as challenging as they are inescapable.
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MILITARY CONTINGENCIES IN MEGACITIES
AND SUB-MEGACITIES
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary military operations in large cities
are fraught with risk, particularly for conventional
military forces fighting unconventional enemies. Indeed, cities are in some ways a great leveler in warfare,
negating many of the advantages of high technology,
constricting opportunities for maneuver operations,
slowing the tempo of battle, and limiting the application of “shock and awe.” Moreover, the United States
does not have a particularly impressive record when
it comes to urban combat. The path from the battle of
Hue in 1968 to the second battle of Fallujah in 2004
seemed all too short as the United States progressed
from destroying one city in order to save it in Vietnam to achieving the kind of victory it could not really
afford in Iraq. As one study observed:
cities possess great numbers of noncombatants, are
dense with vital infrastructures and important sociopolitical institutions, and are usually cluttered threedimensional spaces that pose significant logistical and
navigational challenges. It suffices to say that these
and other characteristics conspire to create a daunting
environment for U.S. forces.1

In spite of the complex, highly cautionary nature
of the urban environment for military forces, however, cities are becoming ever more important politically and economically. Historians examining the 21st
century are likely to look back upon it as a century of
massive and unparalleled urbanization. Indeed, some
of the cities that will rise to prominence in the 21st
century will likely become as important and distinc1

tive in their own way as Athens, Rome, and Constantinople at the height of their grandeur. Moreover, connectivity among many cities is growing. Although not
all cities deserve to be characterized as global cities,
more cities are becoming more connected to the global
economy. In many respects, cities act as the hubs of
a globalized world, providing the transportation and
communications linkages that facilitate global flows
of finance, commodities, and people. Saskia Sassen
has argued that much of the global economic activity moves through a growing network of global cities:
although there is a “disproportionate concentration in
cities of the global North,” such as New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Zurich, and Hong Kong, cities
in the developing world, such as Sao Paulo, Mexico
City, Johannesburg, and Shanghai, have also become
a part of this network.2 Moreover, during the next 2
decades, as the developing world becomes almost the
sole engine of urbanization, its contribution to the network of global cities will grow significantly. To put it
simply, global cities will increasingly become a global
phenomenon. Therefore, it is also likely that cities will
become more important strategically, and that the
United States will find itself at some point in the nottoo-distant future engaged in military contingencies
in large cities.
Dimensions of Urbanization.
Unfortunately, the notion of an increasingly urban
world is often repeated but rarely unpackaged beyond the observation that the majority of the world’s
population now lives in cities. In reality, urbanization has multiple dimensions, each of which poses its
own set of challenges to the forces of governance and
order and to the hopes for successful military action
in urban areas.
2

• The advent of metacities. One of the most important developments in the trend toward
urbanization is the emergence of a small but
growing number of metacities, that is cities—or
perhaps, more accurately, continuous urban agglomerations that often transcend the boundaries of any one city—with populations of over 20
million people. Although Tokyo was for some
years the only city officially in this category, the
figures provided by the Demographia website
in January 2015 suggest that it has been joined
by Jakarta, Delhi, Manila, Seoul-Incheon,
Shanghai, Karachi, Beijing, the greater New
York area, Guangzhou-Foshan, Sao Paulo, and
Mexico City.3 The sheer size of such cities will
create major environmental hazards, generate
immense law and order problems (especially
in poorer areas), and strain infrastructures that
are already over-stretched. In some cases, the
stresses and strains could prove overwhelming.
• An increase in the number of megacities, that is,
cities with populations in excess of 10 million
people. In 1950, the only city of this kind was
New York; by 1995, there were 14 such cities—
most of which were in the developing world. It
was anticipated that by 2015 there would be 23
megacities, with 19 of them in the developing
world. In actuality, in 2015 there were 34 urban
agglomerations with over 10 million people.
Twenty-one of them had between 10 and 20
million inhabitants, and the other 13 had over
20 million people.4 By 2016, two more cities
had joined the ranks of megacities, bringing the
total to 36.5
• A marked increase in the number of what
might be termed emerging- or mini-megacities.
3

According to one observer writing in 2002, it
was anticipated that by 2015 “the number of
urban areas with populations between five and
ten million will shoot from 7 to 37.”6 This has
proved to be a slight underestimation, with the
Demographia report of January 2015 identifying
41 cities in this category. The United Nations
(UN) put the figure slightly higher, at 43, and
noted that these cities have over 300 million
inhabitants. It also noted that “the number of
such cities is expected to grow to 63 by 2030
and house more than 400 million people, representing close to 9 percent of the global urban
population.”7
• The continued growth in the number of cities with populations between 1 and 5 million
inhabitants. By 2015, there were 419 cities in
this category.8 The importance of such cities is
difficult to overestimate. If megacities are the
heavyweights of urbanization, and mini-megacities are the light heavyweights, these cities are
the middle weights—and there are lots of them.
• A large increase in the number of smaller cities with populations less than 500,000 people.
According to the UN in 2014, almost one-half
of the world’s urban population lived in settlements with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.9
“While this proportion is projected to shrink
over time, by 2030 these small cities and towns
will still be home to around 45 percent of urban
dwellers.”10 Although such centers are a less
compelling focus of attention compared to the
larger cities, they cannot be ignored, because
there are so many of them.
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The most notable feature of this distribution is
that it resembles a power law with a long tail: there
are relatively few megacities, while there are many
smaller—but still large—cities. As the population
metric decreases, the number of cities in that category
increases significantly. The implication of this for the
U.S. Army is that, while the megacity scenario has to
be factored into contingency planning as a worst case,
the odds of U.S. involvement in the various subsets
of smaller cities (5 to 10 million, 2 to 5 million, 1 to
2 million, and 500,000 to 1 million) probably increase
as the size goes down. Accordingly, the analysis here
includes both megacities and what, for convenience,
are termed sub-megacities.
The issue of what size cities the U.S. military should
focus upon has become a bone of contention among
military scholars and analysts. The focus coming
from the Army Chief of Staff has been on megacities,
which was encapsulated in the U.S. Army’s June 2014
publication of Megacities and the United States Army:
Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future. This report was an explicit recognition that rapid and often
uncontrolled urbanization has significantly changed
the international security environment in which U.S.
military forces have to operate. It was also a tacit acknowledgement that the U.S. Army is more likely to
have to operate within dense urban environments in
which tactical maneuvers are constrained and the superiority of firepower is more easily neutralized than
on traditional large, open, and fluid battlefields—and
that, therefore, it should prepare much more systematically than in the past for such contingencies. Yet,
not all the responses to this have been favorable. Michael Evans, in particular, has argued that the focus
on megacities is based on “a selective interpretation
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of the highly complex process of 21st century global
urbanization.”11 A major component of his critique is
that:
megacities are not necessarily the principal urban areas in which American forces may be called upon to
fight in the future. Rather, middleweight and smaller
cities remain just as likely to provide important operational environments in the years ahead.12

In some ways, this conclusion is reinforced by the
trends discussed above and the relative number of
cities in each of the categories. Given the power law
distribution of a few extremely large (and many much
smaller) cities, it is more likely that the United States
will become involved in a sub-megacity than in a
megacity or metacity. At the same time, this does not
preclude a military contingency in a massive urban
space. Indeed, the problem with Evan’s critique, as
with many other discussions of strategy and security,
is that it presents what is in effect a false dichotomy. It
argues that the focus should be on smaller, rather than
larger, cities, when, in fact, the United States needs to
think about military contingencies both in megacities
and in sub-megacities.
A second component of Evans’ critique is that:
megacities are not sui generis; they do not represent a
novel military phenomenon. The military processes of
operating in any city are drawn from fundamentals of
urban warfare tried and tested by land forces since at
least the middle of the twentieth century. Future technological developments notwithstanding, most fundamentals of urban warfare are likely to remain relevant
for general-purpose forces even in a conglomeration
on the scale of a megacity.13
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There is something to this argument, but it ignores
the possibility that a difference in scale can at some
point become a difference in kind. A megacity, for example, could swallow up a military division in a way
that a city of a million people could not. Moreover,
it can be argued that by preparing for the worst-case
contingency in a megacity, the United States would
be better able to deal with lesser contingencies in submegacities. The converse, however, is not necessarily
true. While the principles of strategy and warfare apply in both small and large cities, and the challenges
of operating in an urban environment remain very
similar, scale cannot be dismissed. Preparing for a
Category 5 hurricane while hoping that it will not
happen is a much more sensible approach than basing
contingency plans on wishful thinking about the low
probability of such an event and preparing only for a
Category 3 hurricane. Given the challenges that will
face the U.S. Army in any urban environment, planning and training to operate in a megacity should provide capabilities and skills that could also be used for
operations in smaller cities.
At the same time, it has to be recognized that urbanization not only has multiple dimensions, but
that it also takes on different forms in different countries and regions. Moreover, although urbanization
is one of the most important megatrends of the 21st
century, it cannot be seen in isolation. Urbanization
interacts with other powerful drivers of change, such
as globalization and neo-liberalism, continued population growth, global climate change, and technological advancement; the impact of these interactions can
be as profound as the individual drivers themselves.
Indeed, the nature of these interactions can be positive or negative and can intensify or ameliorate the
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adverse consequences of urbanization. This helps to
explain the disconnect between the broad consensus
about the growing importance of cities in the 21st
century, and the starkly divergent assessments as to
whether cities are likely to be positive or negative in
their impact on global prosperity, global security, and
global order. While there are often particular nuances
in individual studies, it is possible to identify several
distinct schools of thought regarding cities—what are
termed here for convenience—urban optimists, urban
pessimists, and urban pragmatists. Inevitably, this is a
gross simplification of the debate, which in many respects is as diverse as the cities themselves. Comparing
Moscow with Mogadishu, Tokyo with Tegucigalpa, or
London with Lagos is not very helpful, except for the
way it highlights the vast gulf between not only large
and small, or developed and developing cities, but also
between the orderly and the chaotic. In part, the empirical diversity helps to explain the highly divergent
assessments, and yet, other factors are also at work.
Many aid and development scholars, for example,
see enormous potential in cities with their economies
of scale in service provision, concentrations of labor,
and opportunities for entrepreneurship and creativity. Equally appropriately, security specialists focus
on urban violence, disorder, and the growing threats
to national and global security that can emanate from
cities. In effect, judgments about the costs and benefits
of urbanization depend in large part on the analytic
framework one starts from and the specific focus one
adopts within it.
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Urbanization Optimists.
On the one hand, cities are widely and in many cases appropriately seen as engines of economic growth;
repositories of wealth, power, and entrepreneurship;
and centers of culture, scholarship, and innovation.
They provide economies of scale in service delivery
and a wide variety of many employment opportunities. They facilitate high levels of social and economic
creativity.14 Cities also provide many of the key nodes
in a globalized world, acting as major hubs and transmission belts for the flows of goods, people, and capital
associated with globalization. This vision was encapsulated in the UN-Habitat Report, State of the World’s
Cities 2012/13. Although the report acknowledged that
prosperity was not always evenly distributed within
cities, it described the city as:
the home of prosperity. It is the place where human
beings find satisfaction of basic needs and essential
public and private goods, where commodities can be
found in sufficiency and their utility enjoyed. Cities
are where material and immaterial aspects of life are
realized, providing contentment and happiness and
increasing the prospects of individual and collective
well-being.15

The same report noted that urban areas are “becoming
not just the dominant form of habitat for humankind,
but also the engine-rooms of human development
as a whole.”16 In effect, the report argued, cities are
continuing to play—albeit on a larger scale than ever
before—their time-honored role as centers of prosperity: “in the 21st as in much earlier centuries, people
congregate in cities to realize aspirations and dreams,
fulfill needs and turn ideas into realities.”17
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Such observations reflect a tendency toward a form
of urban triumphalism that is captured in the work of
Edward Glaeser, who argued that cities have been:
engines of innovation since Plato and Socrates bickered in an Athenian marketplace. The streets of Florence gave us the Renaissance, and the streets of Birmingham gave us the Industrial Revolution. The great
prosperity of contemporary London and Bangalore
and Tokyo comes from their ability to produce new
thinking. Wandering these cities . . . is to study nothing less than human progress.18

Moreover, Glaeser argues, cities in the developed
world:
have survived the tumultuous end of the industrial
age and are now wealthier, healthier, and more alluring than ever. In the world’s poorer places, cities are
expanding enormously because urban density provides the clearest path from poverty to prosperity.19

Highlighting these arguments is not to suggest that
Glaeser ignores either the problems brought about by
rapid and unplanned urbanization or the challenges
stemming from the marginalization and exclusion of
large segments of the urban population. Nevertheless,
there is an assumption that these problems and challenges will be met in the future as they were in the
past: that in the same way that the London described
by Charles Dickens was transformed into the vibrant
cosmopolitan London of today, so will the Lagos of today be transformed into the vibrant well-functioning
metropolis of tomorrow. In this view, the march of
progress is inexorable.
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A subset of the urban optimists blends the promise
of cities with the promise of technology. This has resulted in the emergence of the concept of smart cities—
that is, cities that are not only environmentally friendly, but also integrate and exploit high technology to
control power, flows, and the delivery of services and
goods. Closely linked to the notion of smart cities is
the Internet of Things, which is also likely to be largely
urban in character, or at the very least, most powerful and pervasive where there are large concentrations
of people, homes, and businesses. There is, of course,
the possibility that even smart cities might have their
own dystopian underside where dense connectivity
and transparency become intrusion, surveillance, and
oppression. Yet, it is also clear that smart cities are
most likely to be efficient, well-functioning, and, for
the most part, able to provide high levels of security
and safety to their citizens. The marriage of urbanization and technology offers multiple opportunities
for synergy: scale and efficiency; social networks and
technological networks; and concentrations of wealth,
entrepreneurship, and innovation that are connected
with similar concentrations elsewhere. The smart city
of the near future will not have the Medici family,
but will have an elite group of high-technology specialists sensitive to environmental needs and highly
responsive to citizens adept in using social media to
articulate concerns and aggregate policy preferences.
If the image of the smart city feeds into a vision of
utopian urbanization, however, this vision is not universally shared. At the opposite end of the spectrum
are scholars who identify and elucidate the dark side
of urbanization.
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Urbanization Pessimists.
Among those whose expectations about future cities contrast most dramatically with the urbanization
optimists are R.H. Liotta and James Minkel, Richard
Norton, and David Kilcullen. All of these authors present variations on the theme of dystopian urbanization
that are powerful, haunting, and compelling. At the
very least, these visions of current and future trends in
urbanization capture an emerging, inescapable reality
for large cohorts of people, particularly in the developing world. Perhaps for every smart city, there will
be dozens of dysfunctional cities, with widespread
slums; high levels of crime, violence, and instability;
congestion, environmental degradation, and a large
informal economy that serves as an indispensable
coping mechanism. “Grinding poverty, environmental degradation, income inequalities, historical socioeconomic inequalities, marginalization and various
forms of exclusion” are just some of the problems
facing rapidly expanding cities in the 21st century.20
When they are interrelated with drugs, weapons,
and the youth bulge, these problems and challenges
become even more formidable.
There are several reasons urbanization in the developing world has a very significant downside.First
is the sheer speed of population growth in many cities
in the developing world. While it is clear that many
large cities in the developed world also grew in a relatively short period, the growth was neither as large
nor as dramatic and sustained as the way cities have
grown—and are continuing to grow—in the developing world. Liotta and Miskel, for example, compare
the 30-percent increase in the growth of New York between 1950 and 2015 with Dhaka’s population increase
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of more than 5,400 percent during the same period.21
The authors also note that although London grew by
sevenfold in the 19th century, Kinshasa’s growth between 1950 and 2015 approached a factor of 50, and
Lagos, a factor of 25.22
The speed of population growth in cities is related
to what might be termed “sequencing.” Cities in the
developed world generally had infrastructure and basic amenities in place prior to—or at least in tandem
with—the expansion of their populations. In effect,
the expansion of cities in the global north reflected the
logic in a popular movie about a baseball stadium—
build it and they will come. The population surge into
the cities of the global south, however, preceded the
building, while also revealing that the aphorism cannot be easily reversed. Much of the surging population came before it was built, and in many cases, it
has still not been built. The massive influx of population swamped the existing infrastructure and capacity for service provision—whether in terms of water,
sanitation, power, or adequate road systems—and
even where there have been efforts to extend infrastructure and services, these efforts have been wholly
inadequate to the needs of the new urban migrants. A
massive growth of slums and informal settlements has
been the most obvious result. Moreover, as Liotta and
Miskel point out:
first world megacities expanded at a more manageable
pace and . . . did so after their parent nation-states—
and their governing structures—had been firmly established and the population had more or less settled
on a common national identity. Further, past megacities took shape before the communications revolution
raised their residents’ expectations and before globalization integrated them as deeply into the international economy as Cairo, Rio, and Lagos today.23
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Closely linked to the sequencing is the fact that
much of the urbanization in the developing world can
be described as spontaneous rather than planned. The
lack of planning is closely connected to issues of land
and property ownership. Many of those who come to
the expanding cities of the developing world live in
homes within urban settlements, and neither the individual homes nor the community settlement has a legal basis, something that adds a degree of precariousness to lives that are already full of hardship. Irregular
land occupation—and the vulnerability that goes with
it—is a serious problem for many city dwellers in the
developing world. Wherever they occur, these illegal
settlements are also a problem for city planners and
managers intent on ensuring the efficient functioning
of the city. At the same time, they feed into the prospects for long-term instability in the event that either
state or city authorities seek to reclaim land that, in
their view, has been illegally occupied, or, those who
have occupied land demand that their de facto ownership becomes de jure. This has important implications for stability and order in emerging and rapidly
expanding cities.
It is clear from all this that the challenges of urban management in the 21st century are formidable.
Yet, in many cases, there appear to be little capacity to
manage these challenges. As Liotta and Miskel note:
with the rise of massive urban centers in Africa and
Asia, cities that will matter most in the twenty-first century are located in less-developed, struggling states. A
number of these huge megalopolises—whether Lagos
or Karachi, Dhaka or Kinshasa—reside in states often
unable or simply unwilling to manage the challenges
that their vast and growing urban populations pose.
There are no signs that their governments will prove
more capable in the future.24
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Yet, the issue is not simply one of capacity, but also
one of will. In this connection, Mike Davis famously
noted that in much of the developing world:
the idea of an interventionist state strongly committed
to social housing and job development seems either a
hallucination or a bad joke, because governments long
ago abdicated any serious effort to combat slums and
redress urban marginality.25

He also argued that the minimalist role of national
government was reinforced by neoliberal economic
orthodoxy and the structural adjustment policies
imposed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. If anything, however, the impact of
neoliberalism has become even more pronounced as,
in many countries, it has encouraged and legitimized
state abdication of responsibility to its citizens.
Many of these problems have been most explicitly
articulated by Norton, who coined the term “feral cities” to describe concentrated urban spaces that can
be regarded either as “failed,” “collapsing,” or “collapsed.”26 Kilcullen has offered a similar assessment,
arguing that:
rapid urban growth in coastal, underdeveloped areas is overloading economic, social, and governance
systems, straining city infrastructure, and overburdening the carrying capacity of cities designed for
much smaller populations. This is likely to make the
most vulnerable cities less and less able to meet the
challenges of population growth, coastal urbanization, and connectedness. The implications for future
conflict are profound, with more people competing
for scarcer resources in crowded, underserviced, and
under governed urban areas.27
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From this perspective, cities are likely to be a major
driver of instability and insecurity in the 21st century.
Unfortunately, the traditional focus of attention on
states in international relations has contributed to a
neglect of cities. What makes this neglect all the more
problematic is that in some cases, city failure could be
a major contributor to state failure. This is particularly
likely when the city in question is a capital city and
has an inordinate share of the state’s population and
wealth. In some developing countries, for example,
the state does not have much of a presence outside the
capital. In such cases, the failure of the city to continue
functioning as a viable entity—because of the gradual
accumulation of problems such as crime, environmental decay, and a growing gap between the need for
services and governance on the one side and the provision of these on the other—could have a profound
impact on the state as a whole.
The difficulty, of course, is that city collapse is not
easily predictable. One reason is that cities are highly
complex entities, which almost invariably contain a
mixture of functional and dysfunctional elements. As
such, they can often continue to operate on the edge
of chaos or collapse, without actually tipping over.
In some cases, the tipping point could result from a
natural disaster such as an earthquake—something to
which Mexico City, for example, is particularly vulnerable. In other instances, small changes could have
major effects, moving the city into failure or collapse.
City collapse, in turn, could contribute to state collapse; sometimes the two could be synonymous. This
is most likely in developing economies based on a hub
and spoke model, in which commercial activities are
directed from the capital. In these circumstances, any
major disruption in the capital would have significant
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cascading effects through the national economy. In
other words, the symbiosis of cities and states is something that will be increasingly difficult to ignore in the
future.
The difficulty is that both optimists and pessimists
can find examples to bolster their argument and the
cases that confound them. Moreover, the reality of
many cities—with many if not most cities having both
well-ordered localities and spaces, and poorly governed and dangerous spaces—is far messier than this
neat and dichotomous typology suggests. The mixture
of the smart and the dysfunctional described above is
likely to exist within cities as much as between them.
Observers who can most accurately be characterized
as “urbanization pragmatists” best capture this.
Urbanization Pragmatists.
Robert Muggah, in a very astute analysis, has encapsulated these competing assessments in what he
termed the “urban dilemma”—a dilemma that, in his
view, is:
exemplified by the paradoxical effects of urbanization
in the twenty first century: as a force for unparalleled
development on the one hand, and as a risk for insecurity amongst the urban poor on the other.28

Muggah and John De Boer have played a major role
in articulating the notion of “fragile cities,” contrasting the notion of fragility with that of resilience.29 De
Boer and Muggah recognize that the notion of a fragile city is not easily and simply defined. Drawing on
their pioneering work, however, a fragile city can best
be understood as one where there is a mix of order
and chaos; where both governance and service provi17

sion exist, but are patchy and uneven; where levels of
violence range from high to low across different zones
or localities within the city; and where there is both
wealth and poverty, most often segregated and distant from one another, but sometimes juxtaposed in
uncomfortable proximity.
Urbanization pragmatists see both promise and
peril in the growing importance of cities in global
economics and politics. They see cities as economic
dynamos and as having the potential to contribute
significantly to development. At the same time, they
recognize, in Muggah’s words, that:
all cities are fragile. The intensity of their fragility,
however, varies considerably across time and space.
Some cities—Aleppo, Caracas, Kabul, or Mogadishu—are affected by acute fragility and are close to
collapse. Others—Abuja, Baltimore, Dhaka, and San
Salvador—are also at risk, albeit to a lesser degree.
Even cities like Amsterdam, London, New York, Paris,
and Tokyo are not immune.30

The key point about a fragile city, however, is that it
can tip both positively and negatively. A fragile city,
with the right leadership, some careful management,
and some luck, can become a smart and resilient city.
As Muggah acknowledges:
city fragility is not permanent. There are remarkable
examples of once dangerous cities turning things
around. How do they do this? They start with enlightened leadership, especially successive mayors
that make a plan and stick to it. The best cases involve
evidence-based and targeted approaches to mitigating
risks. Cities that purposefully build inclusive public
spaces, support predictable transport, invest in hotspot policing, create meaningful opportunities for
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young people, and plan carefully to mitigate natural
disasters are the most likely to shift from fragility to
resilience.31

In this connection, London over 150 years has moved
from a largely feral city toward becoming a smart city
with global influence. Ironically, Dickens would not
recognize the London of the early-21st century, but he
would be fairly familiar with the deprivations of the
favelas (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro or the slums
of Lagos, in spite of their cultural contrasts with 19thcentury London. Similarly, the New York of 2015 is
very different from the New York of the 1970s, when
violence was much more pervasive and citizens far
more fearful than they are today. Those cities that fail
to do what London and New York have done, however, are likely to move from being fragile to feral,
where areas of order, wealth, security and safety, and
upward social and economic mobility are surrounded
by and ultimately eclipsed by “red zones” of violence,
disorder, poverty, and despair.
In other words, cities are highly dynamic and can
move from one of the categories identified in Table 1
to another. Urban blight and urban gentrification can
be understood as two sides of the dynamic nature of
cities, simply representing movement in opposite directions. Indeed, when examining the notion of a fragile city, complexity and paradox come to the fore. Both
smart cities and feral cities, in effect, are ideal types—
one of promise, one of peril—and are at opposite ends
of a continuum, whereas fragile cities are located in
the middle, with enormous potential for both advance
and decay. The major characteristics of the three types
of city are summarized in Table 1.
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Smart Cities—
Townsend

Fragile Cities—Muggah
and De Boer

Feral Cities - Norton

Well ordered

Emphasis on both the
positive and negative
effects of urbanization
as something that can
promote economic
development and create
insecurity

Urban spaces that can
be regarded either as
“failed,” “collapsing,”
or “collapsed”

Low levels of
violence

Rapid urban population
growth
Income inequalities result
in higher levels of violence
Zones of order and
security plus zones of
violence that sometimes
spills over

High levels of violence
Dickensian-dystopian
Disorderly and chaotic

Technology
integrated with
infrastructure

Enclaves of technology
and capital along with
enclaves of exclusion and
expulsion
Gated communities and
slums

Low levels of
technology except
for feature phones
that give access to
Internet

Effective and
efficient service
provision

Service provision uneven
and patchy

Formal
Governance
Mechanisms

Mixed/Competing/
Collaborative Governance
Mechanisms
Governance varies from
one part of the city to
another

Absence of state or
municipal services
Coping mechanisms,
and informal and illicit
economies
Alternative
Governance
Mechanisms
dominate
The formal authorities
(state and city) have
lost control

Table 1. Characteristics of Smart, Fragile,
and Feral Cities.
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The implication of the distinctions between smart,
fragile, and feral cities for military contingencies in
megacities and sub-megacities is that size is not the
only important differentiator. The challenges that the
U.S. Army would face in the event of some kind of
intervention in a megacity or sub-megacity could differ considerably depending on whether the city was
smart or feral, or where it stood and in which direction it was moving within the fragile category. The
other consideration that could have massive implications for the probability of success or failure would be
the way the strategic purpose for such involvement is
designed.
THE RATIONALES FOR MILITARY
CONTINGENCIES IN MEGACITIES
AND SUB-MEGACITIES
The dangers associated with military operations
in urban terrain are very well understood: military
contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities are
unlikely to be high on the U.S. Army’s list of things it
would eagerly do. Indeed, in Megacities and the United
States Army referred to above, the authors acknowledge that the question of relevance often arises. Their
response is that this might be a matter of strategic
necessity rather than strategic choice. They note that
neither Pearl Harbor nor 9/11 were “predicted by decision makers of the time,” yet “led to unanticipated
military commitments.”32 As well as the possibility of
a military intervention in a megacity resulting from
some kind of strategic shock, they also note an assessment of national interests that considers how megacities could become:
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magnets for international attention and demand military intervention will aid military planners in avoiding future strategic surprises. This is an important distinction; it is less of a question of why the U.S. Army
would go than a question of what conditions would
draw the Army into a megacity.33

This monograph seeks at least a preliminary answer to
this question and identifies six different kinds of strategic considerations that might lead civilian decisionmakers to determine the need for the use of military
force with regard to events, trends, and developments
relating to a particular megacity.
Humanitarian Disaster Relief.
The first is that the United States will provide some
kind of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a
natural disaster. Many of the world’s major cities are
vulnerable to earthquakes or flooding, or in some cases to both. San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Mexico
City, Jakarta, Tehran, Istanbul, and Manila are among
the world’s leading cities in earthquake zones. Many
other cities are vulnerable to major flooding. Such
risks have always been present, but as cities grow,
the risks also grow. For example, a World Bank study
noted that “in a rapidly urbanizing developing world,
the growth of population and economic assets in cities will lead to a rapidly increasing concentration of
hazard risk in urban areas.”34 It goes on to note that
the “population in large cities exposed to cyclones is
estimated to increase from 310 to 680 million between
2000 and 2050,” while “urban population exposed in
areas with a significant probability of a major earthquake increases from 370 million in 2000 to 870 million in 2050.”35 Other studies have observed that cities
22

in the developed world typically have a high degree of
resilience in the face of such disasters. In the cities in
developing countries, however, resilience and the capacity to absorb the impact of a disaster will be much
lower. Moreover, where urbanization is largely unplanned, building codes and standards are low, and
overcrowding is the norm, those living in poor urban
areas are particularly vulnerable. The probability of
such disasters is likely to increase as global climate
change makes extreme weather events more frequent.
In the context of climate change, Kilcullen’s argument
about the increasing importance of littoral cities becomes even more pertinent. Many large coastal cities
are increasingly vulnerable in the medium and long
term to rising sea levels resulting from global climate
change. According to one study, which assessed the
top 20 cities in terms of the number of people exposed
to coastal flooding now and projected figures for 2070,
the situation is likely to become increasingly dire. Nowhere is this more obvious than in South Asia. Kolkata currently has nearly 2 million people exposed, but
this is expected to increase to over 14 million by 2070.36
Mumbai will jump from under 3 million currently
to over 11.4 million.37 Other cities at risk include Ho
Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Bangkok, Rangoon, Alexandria, Lagos, Tokyo, and Jakarta, while both Miami
and New York are also on this list.38 Perhaps nowhere
is as vulnerable as Bangladesh, which has three cities—Dhaka, Khulna, and Chittagong—on the list and
is expected to have over 70 million people exposed to
coastal flooding by 2070.39 Dhaka alone currently has
under a million people vulnerable to coastal flooding,
but will have over 11 million vulnerable people by
2070.40 The irony is that Dhaka itself has become a refuge for Bangladeshi victims of monsoon flooding. As
one commentary observed, the majority of migrants
coming into Dhaka:
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hail from coastal areas that are already experiencing
rising sea levels, increased salinity, destructive floods
and cyclones. At least 400,000 people move to Dhaka
every year, according to the World Bank, while the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 70% of Dhaka’s slum-dwellers moved there
fleeing some sort of environmental shock.41

The irony, as the author notes, is that the people seeking safety in the short term by moving to coastal cities
might actually be putting themselves at greater risk in
the long term, given the vulnerability of these cities to
storm surges and rising sea levels.
There is an added irony from the perspective of
U.S. military planners: a major natural disaster could
actually change the categorization of a particular city,
rendering a smart city fragile, and precipitating the
collapse of a fragile city into a feral one. One only has
to look at the experience of New Orleans under the
impact of Katrina to see how a city can rapidly degenerate into anomie and anarchy, with the normal
rules and norms of urban life abruptly jettisoned. This
has important implications. Insofar as the U.S. Army
had made particular contingency plans for a specific
city, these would be complicated if not attenuated by
the disaster. At the very least, the restoration of order
and stability would have to accompany if not precede
major disaster relief operations. This effort could also
create opposition.
Under many circumstances, a United States-led
humanitarian intervention for disaster mitigation and
a vulnerable and exposed population, ready for any
source of assistance, would welcome recovery. Yet, it
is not inconceivable that, even in these circumstances, not everyone will be happy to see U.S. forces in
their city, and pockets of protest and resistance could
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quickly develop. Even if they do not, the designation
of the contingency as a humanitarian assistance mission does not mean that the forces would be immune
to hostile action. It is conceivable that terrorist and
rebel groups that are very hostile toward the United
States would see U.S. forces in a megacity as a more
convenient and easier target set than the continental
United States. For those with limited capabilities who
are intent on attacking the United States, attacks on
U.S. forces involved in a humanitarian mission might
be a very attractive alternative. Those engaging in
such attacks might well see the chaos and complexity
of the post-disaster environment as an opportunity to
engage in asymmetric warfare, using the disaster-torn
city to avoid direct confrontations with U.S. forces.
Depending on the scale and scope of the attacks on
U.S. forces, at best they could divert attention and resources away from rescue missions and efforts to provide basic provisions and restore services. Moreover,
U.S. defensive measures could be portrayed as aggressive, undermining much of the goodwill that would
otherwise be created. At worst, such attacks could
transform the nature of the intervention, not through
mission creep but through rapid mission transformation. Even the most innocuous involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity, therefore, has the potential for
going badly wrong.
Military Support for Civilian Authorities
in a Restoration of Order.
One of the most striking aspects of the continued
evolution of violence in recent years has been the
growing overlap between high-level criminality and
low-level warfare. Just to underline this, in 2010, more
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people (15,273) were victims of homicides in Mexico
than were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.42
The Iraq Body Count organization recorded 4,038 civilian deaths from violence in 2010, while in Afghanistan, in 2010, military and civilian deaths were around
3,500.43 Moreover, even controlling for population
differences, Mexican homicide rates in 2010 were not
very different from—and were probably slightly higher than—those in the two war zones. Although drugrelated killings in Mexico appear to have declined in
recent years, there has been a significant increase in
homicides in the Northern Triangle countries of Central America—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
According to some observers, current and recent levels of violence in El Salvador and Guatemala exceed
those of the brutal civil wars these countries fought
into the 1990s. Much of the violence emanates from
drug trafficking organizations competing for control
of particular routes and from gang wars between and
within the two major maras (gangs), Mara Salvatrucha
13 and Barrio 18. Perhaps even more important for the
analysis here, much of the violence is concentrated in
cities. For several years, San Pedro Sula in Honduras
had the unenviable distinction of the highest homicide
rate of any city in the world, although it now appears
to have been overtaken by San Salvador.
The implication of all this is that many cities in
the developing world, especially but not exclusively
in Latin America and the Caribbean, have to confront
levels of violence that could at some point become
overwhelming. While concerns over sovereignty and
some lingering distrust of the United States are likely
to inhibit requests for assistance by governments in
Latin America, the possibility that, at some point, such
a request might be made cannot be excluded. The
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inhibitions on the part of the United States to responding with military support are likely to be as strong
if not stronger. Nevertheless, if an allied country in
Latin America were facing chaos and intense levels of
violence in one of its major cities, some kind of intervention to restore order might be seen as preferable
to another migrant crisis involving not only unaccompanied minors but also a much broader segment
of the population fleeing from violence. Obviously
much would depend on the circumstances, but to rule
out such a contingency could be a mistake. Is it highly probable? Absolutely not. However, neither is it
impossible.
Military Intervention in a Strategic City.
One of the reasons a military intervention in Latin
America is deemed so unlikely is that, despite proximity, it is rarely regarded by the United States as a region
of primary geopolitical, strategic, or economic importance. Yet, there are other cities around the world—
some related to the continued conflict with extremist
groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
and the Taliban—that could be endowed with such
importance, not in the least because they are related
to ongoing military operations elsewhere. Karachi, for
example, has been critical in resupplying U.S. forces
in Afghanistan; if extremist elements were to initiate
large-scale attacks on supply lines and the attendant
support structures, it is not clear that the United States
would accept the resulting disruption without some
kind of response. Moreover, as the world becomes
increasingly urbanized, the strategic significance of at
least some cities is likely to grow considerably. The
critique by Evans of Megacities and the United States
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Army did not question the growing strategic importance of cities as such; rather, it was about which cities
fell into the category of high importance, something
that, he argued, was not determined exclusively by
size.44 For Evans, some smaller cities might have more
strategic importance than some megacities and, therefore, might require U.S. military involvement. Liotta
and Miskel use the term “alpha cities”—a term they
recognize is not widely used—to describe cities like
Mumbai, which are critical nodes in the global economic system.45 As they note, “with more cell phones
per capita of any city on the subcontinent, Mumbai
generates more than one-sixth of India’s GDP.”46
Mumbai also represents an important trend in which a
growing number of cities in developing countries are
developing a trajectory that will move them into the
category of global cities (as defined by Sassen). Some
cities are important, not only economically, but also in
terms of their political significance. Liotta and Miskel,
for example, describe Cairo as a “critical city.”47 They
note that in spite of—and perhaps even because of—
the unrest in Egypt itself and in the Middle East writ
large, Cairo:
remains crucial to the United States in the Middle East.
Second, Cairo is a city in which national governance
heavily invests. The Egyptian government recognizes
that disorder in Cairo threatens the stability of the entire state and, for that matter, the entire region.48

Recognizing the strategic significance of a city does
not mean that the United States would necessarily be
willing to deploy military forces to that city. Nevertheless, as strategic calculation catches up with the
intrinsic importance of key cities in a globalized but
highly fractious world, then the kind of considerations
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outlined in Megacities and the United States Army, and
extended to a broader range of cities, could become
even more compelling. Consequently, an intervention
in an “alpha” or “critical” city with major strategic
significance that is either intrinsically important (such
as a global financial and communications hub) or has
become important to the implementation of U.S. strategy in a particular region and the continued viability
of a regional ally might well be on the list of policy
options.
Military Involvement in a City in the Context of
Counterinsurgency.
Closely related to the idea of a strategic intervention in a city, but in a narrower context, is that the
United States—when involved in another counterinsurgency campaign (and distasteful as this might be,
it cannot be ruled out)—will find as it did in Iraq that
a specific city becomes endowed with a great deal of
symbolic and strategic significance. In the current conflict between ISIS on the one side and the Syrian and
Iraqi governments with their respective patrons and
supporters on the other, Mosul clearly falls into such
a category. The city’s fall to ISIS was a massive victory
for the extremist insurgency and provided unprecedented access to massive resources extracted through
taxation and coercion. Indeed, the conquest of Mosul
gave important impetus to the declaration of the Caliphate, while also providing credibility and a sense
of empowerment to the declaration. Indeed, the seizure of the city was critical to the momentum that ISIS
obtained in 2014, and that will not be fully reversed
until Mosul is retaken, thereby depriving ISIS of both
its highly symbolic victory and a vital component
of its resource base. The extent to which the United
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States will go beyond air support to assist forces on
the ground trying to retake Mosul remains uncertain.
Part of that, however, is a result of the formal withdrawal from Iraq by the United States and continuing
concerns about being dragged back into a quagmire
with allies who are weak and unreliable. It is certainly
conceivable that in a future counterinsurgency campaign, the United States will be less risk averse and
less constrained.
The Use of Military Force in a City in the
Context of a Conflict between States.
The parallel to involvement in urban warfare as
part of a counterinsurgency campaign is either defense
of or an offense against a city that is an important strategic prize in a more traditional military conflict, albeit one that is in the so-called gray zone. In the event
that geopolitical competition with Russia increases in
intensity and that Russian President Vladimir Putin,
either as a result of desperation (losing political support at home) or ambition (restoring some semblance
of the Soviet empire), moves directly or indirectly
against one or more of the Baltic states, the United
States could find itself helping in the defense of Riga,
Tallinn, or Vilnius. In a speech in Tallinn, Estonia, in
September 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama reassured the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) Baltic members that they would not again lose
their independence to Moscow as they had done after
World War II. As the President emphasized:
we will defend our NATO allies, and that means every
ally. . . . In this alliance, there are no old members or
new members, no junior partners or senior partners.
They’re just allies, pure and simple.49
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This commitment has been buttressed by the decision to spend more defense money in the region, to
preposition more equipment stockpiles, and to deploy
a combat brigade on a rotating basis at different locations in the region. There is always a danger with
a commitment of this kind, that, although primarily
symbolic, it does entangle the United States in a potential conflict. Symbols can have enormous strategic
significance, as was evident with U.S. troops stationed
in West Berlin during the Cold War. Given the location of West Berlin and the problems of resupply from
a U.S. and NATO perspective, the city was indefensible in the event of a Soviet effort to capture it. As
Thomas Schelling famously noted, the one thing U.S.
troops could do there was to die.50 In other words, the
forces were deployed as a tripwire, as a manifestation
of the U.S. commitment to its European allies and as
part of extended nuclear deterrence, which depended
on what Bernard Brodie called the “marvelous clarity of choice between non war and destruction.”51 Yet,
West Berlin also had a special status that dated back to
the 1948 crisis and the Berlin Airlift. It is far from clear
that the U.S. commitment to the Baltic States and their
capital cities is as strong. Moreover, the current relationship between the United States and Russia is far
less clear-cut than that between the two superpowers
during the Cold War. In adversarial relationships in
which lines and commitments are not clearly demarcated, the potential for mischief, misunderstanding,
and miscalculation is much greater. The implication
is that the United States could find itself having to defend one or more of the Baltic capital cities in an area
where it has long supply lines and other geographic
disadvantages. These are not megacities, but they
have been endowed with some strategic significance.
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In addition, if the commitment is to be credible, then
there has to be at least a readiness and some preparation to operate in these urban environments.
Containment or Quarantine of an Urban Pandemic.
The other kind of urban contingency that could
arise for the U.S. Army stems from the possibility of
a megacity or sub-megacity becoming an incubator
for some kind of infectious disease. In the event of an
urban outbreak of some kind of contagion that could
take on the qualities of a pandemic, it is not inconceivable that there might be an attempt to quarantine the
city. Drastic as this might appear, if the mortality rate
of the outbreak was sufficiently high, and there were
no obvious countermeasures to the disease, then enforced isolation might be the only feasible response.
The difficulty here, of course, is that people would
want to escape from the city and, in some cases,
would pay organized criminals to facilitate their exit.
Consequently, a quarantine would require some kind
of coercive power to back it up—and only military
forces would be capable of imposing this, and even
they would find it difficult. Obviously much would
depend on the city and country involved, whether or
not there was an indigenous capacity for enforcement,
and if there was a willingness to invite external forces
to assist in the containment process. Again, it is a lowprobability contingency; however, as Nassim Taleb
has very persuasively shown, “black swan” events
(that is, events with low probability but high impact)
occur more frequently than we like to acknowledge.52
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Implications.
All of these contingencies have a low probability.
Yet, as discussed above, the events and decisions that
might require some kind of military deployment to or
around a city are neither particularly novel nor without either some kind of precedent or strategic logic.
Yet, in some ways, the problems of urban military
engagements are even more formidable than the preoccupation with megacities suggests. By using one
category such as a megacity—formidable as it might
be—there is a danger of oversimplifying the problem.
The authors of Megacities and the United States Army
take pains to emphasize that megacities vary considerably from one another in so many different ways
that there is no one-size-fits-all response. The analysis
here, however, suggests that the problem is in some
ways greater than that. Each kind of contingency has
its own specific requirements, while the size of the
city adds another important set of variables, as does
its character—smart, fragile, or feral. In other words,
there is a mix-and-match quality that gives a wide variety of permutations.
Yet, the categories help both to bind and to think
through the implications of different kinds of interventions in different size cities that are either smart,
fragile, or feral. The purpose of any operation would
do a great deal to determine its scale, scope, duration,
and manageability. The size of the city would likely be
an important determinant of the force level the United
States would deploy. All cities would require a common core of competencies, skills, and capabilities.
Yet, the character of the city (smart, fragile or feral)
would also require particular subtleties of approach,
distinctive operational techniques, and different
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levels of technology. In other words, the permutations
are many, but the three components (mission, size of
the city, and character of the city) provide important
boundaries within which planners and policymakers
could determine force levels, deployment strategies,
intelligence requirements, and the like.
More generally, as megacities and sub-megacities
take on increasing salience and importance in the next
few decades, they should become a distinct focus of
attention and analysis not only for military planners
but also for intelligence agencies. Understanding and
anticipating developments and events in megacities
and sub-megacities will need to become a central
responsibility of the United States intelligence community, supplementing, and at times even surpassing, both the traditional focus on states and the more
recent focus on transnational actors. An important
prerequisite for enhanced performance at almost every level of intelligence, however, is better thinking
about what a city is, how it works, and what kinds
of constraints and opportunities it provides for the
operations of military forces. Although the focus has
to be on the strategic implications and requirements
for military operations, it is essential nonetheless to
ask fundamental questions about how cities can best
be conceptualized. Accordingly, the next section deals
initially with concepts for approaching and understanding cities, and then uses them as a basis for a
holistic, multi-level approach to intelligence requirements for urban military contingencies.
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CONCEPTUAL THINKING AND LAYERED
INTELLIGENCE FOR URBAN MILITARY
CONTINGENCIES
In the preceding discussion, cities have been distinguished from one another in terms of size and character. Yet, there is a more fundamental question that
has not yet been asked: what is a city? The question is
much easier than the answer. Moreover, the answer
has changed over time as conceptualizations of the
city have become more utilitarian. As one study noted:
the notion of urban remains fleeting, changing from
time to time, differing across political boundaries, and
being modified depending upon the purpose that the
definition of urban would serve. At times, urban populations are defined in terms of administrative boundaries, at times in terms of functional boundaries, and
at times they are defined in terms of ecological factors
such as density and population size.53

In a sense, definitions have been politicized. They
have also become increasingly sophisticated over
time. Even the early answers, however, have captured
important dimensions of the city.
One of the first notions of the city involves the city
as a place with certain attributes in terms of population size, density, and heterogeneity. Sociologist Louis
Wirth, for example, writing in the late-1930s, delineated a city in terms of four characteristics: a relative
permanence; large population size; concentration of
people in a limited space, i.e., high population density; and social heterogeneity.54 To this, one could add
an agglomeration of physical structures that provide
places of work, business, economic production, and
often places of worship and leisure.

35

The economic dimension of the city became the
basis for what has been described as “the functional
definition of urban,” a definition rooted in economic
geography.55 This approach emphasizes that the city
has become a retail market center for broader regional
distribution. Other scholars have developed this argument, highlighting:
the variety of economic functions that take place in an
urban center includes various types of production, but
also educational, political, administrative and socially
related economic activities which tend to employ a
diversely orientated labor force. An important related
concept is that of ‘agglomerative economies,’ which
are a concentration of economic functions that operate
external to a particular firm but make it advantageous
for a firm to locate there. For instance, other firms,
banking, credit, transportation and storage facilities
tend to exist in and around urban centers.56

This concentration of economic functions in turn attracts more people, increasing population density.57
The city, as both a place and a set of economic
functions, conveys important elements of its reality.
A very different conception of the city has been that it
resembles a living organism. Within this, some have
even discussed the metabolism of cities. Drawn from
biology, the concept of metabolism:
refers to physiological processes within living things
that provide the energy and nutrients required by an
organism as the conditions of life itself. These processes can be described in terms of the transformation
of inputs (sunlight, chemical energy, nutrients, water,
and air) into biomass and waste products. . . . Just as
living things require the inputs mentioned above, so
do cities. That is, cities cannot exist without those inputs—urbanites require clean air, water, food, fuel,
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and construction goods to subsist while urban industries need materials for production purposes.58

While this is particularly useful in terms of assessing
the relationship between the city and the environment, the broader notion of any city as a living organism is particularly compelling. It is also particularly
useful in delineating intelligence needs for military
contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities. This
is evident in Table 2, which highlights the parallels between humans and the city as as an organism.
Human Entity

City as an Organism

Skeleton

Physical infrastructure

Core and Periphery

Center and peri-urban

Neural networks

Social networks

Metabolism

Flows

Blood flow

Pulse or rhythm

Brain functions

Governance

Survival instincts: fight-or-flight mechanisms

Coping mechanisms: informal or illegal economies

Immune system: antibodies

Resistance to external intervention

Table 2. Comparison of a Human to a City
as an Organism.
There are, of course, limits to such an analogy.
Kevin Lynch, one of the doyens of urban planning,
has noted that:
cities are not organisms, any more than they are machines, and perhaps even less so. They do not grow
or change of themselves, or reproduce or repair themselves. They are not autonomous entities, nor do they
run through life cycles, or become infected.59
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Such criticisms and caveats notwithstanding, treating
the city as an organism helps to bound the intelligence
process and identify key elements, such as social networks, flows, governance, the rhythm of cities, and the
likely response to external intervention, even when it
might be benign. The idea of the city as an organism
has also become important in understanding some of
the results of the increased size of cities. The work of
Geoffrey B. West, Luís M. A. Bettencourt, and their
colleagues has shown that there are:
systematic scaling laws which explicitly show that
cities are more than the linear sum of their individual components. For example, economic productivity
(value-added in manufacturing, GDP, wages, personal income, etc.) increases systematically on a per capita
basis by 15% with every doubling of a city’s population, regardless of a city’s initial size (whether from,
say, 50,000 to 100,000, or from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000).
Remarkably, these general increasing returns to population size manifest, on average, the same statistical
relationship (the 15% rule) across an extraordinarily
broad range of metrics, regardless of nation or time.
Similar increases apply to almost every socioeconomic
quantity, from innovation rates and rhythms of human behavior to incidence of crime and infectious diseases. They express a continuous and systematic acceleration of socioeconomic processes with increasing
numbers of people, so that larger cities produce and
spend wealth faster, create new ideas more frequently
and suffer from greater incidence of crime all approximately to the same degree.60

The work done by these authors at the Santa Fe Institute also uses the idea of cities as complex emergent
systems. Bettincourt, for example, has emphasized the
importance of networks, arguing that:
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cities are first and foremost large social networks. In
this sense, cities are not just large collections of people,
they are agglomerations of social links. Space, time
and infrastructure play a fundamental role in enabling
social interactions to form and persist, and in allowing them to become open-ended in terms of increased
connectivity and sustainable from the point of view of
energy use and human effort.61

Networks are also an important part of what Michael
Batty has described as “the new science of cities.”62
One of:
the central ideas of this new science is that locations are
really the nodes that define the points where processes
of interaction begin and end . . . instead of thinking
of cities as sets of spaces, places, [and] locations, we
need to think of them as sets of actions, interactions,
and transactions that define their rationale and relate
to the way scale economies generate wealth in social
and economic terms.63

Cities have to be understood as a layered and interacting series of complex adaptive systems involving
actions, interactions, and transactions. This also requires multiple streams of intelligence: information
on network and power structures could be obtained
and updated from the intelligence community; infrastructure mapping, breakdowns from satellite data,
and considerable social, economic, and political intelligence could be obtained from non-governmental
organizations. All of this would lead to an enhanced
understanding of urban dynamics, including patterns
of flows and networks of relationships.64 Operating
effectively in megacities and sub-megacities requires
an understanding of these flows and networks and
an ability to determine when to exploit rather than
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disrupt their dynamics. This focus and approach can
be extended to facilitate the understanding of governance patterns and governance processes in urban
areas. Indeed, the following discussion of intelligence
preparation of and on the urban battlefield looks at 10
different layers of the city, recognizing that these are
not independent from one another, but are constantly
interacting. In complex systems, all variables are interdependent. Indeed, there are clearly multiple sets
of vertical connectors between the various layers, both
direct and indirect. Some of these connectors will have
readily predictable consequences, while others will be
much harder to assess. Nevertheless, by treating these
as a series of layers, it should be possible to elucidate
the need for a comprehensive (if daunting) approach
to intelligence in megacities and sub-megacities. The
key point, however, is that there are multiple connections among and across the layers that also need to
be considered, even though they make the intelligence
task even more formidable.
In thinking about intelligence for military contingencies in urban areas, it is important to consider it
as a dynamic interactive process. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield will be vital prior to action; intelligence preparation on the battlefield will be a continued and even more stringent requirement throughout
the duration of the contingency. As Chad Serena and
Colin P. Clarke noted:
the U.S. military will have to be able to effectively
piece together a comprehensive and actionable intelligence picture, and under enormously challenging circumstances. This will require, at a minimum, an ability to persistently monitor, collect, and interpret—in
near real-time—the millions of bits of data associated
with cellphone communications, social media post-
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ings, financial transactions, and the operational movements of these actors. The challenges associated with
doing so—exposed in Grozny, Sadr City and now
Raqqa—will likely require the U.S. military to increase
the number of intelligence platforms it employs and to
develop the ability to manage and interpret in a timely
fashion the unending stream of data. Failure to do so
will exacerbate the difficulties associated with operating in megacities, prolong conflicts therein, and create circumstances in which hostile groups can exploit
physical and virtual sanctuaries largely unobserved
by U.S. forces.65

Against this requirement, the levels or slices of the
intelligence challenge are identified in Table 3.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Level 6
Level 7
Level 8
Level 9
Level 10

Subterranean
Topography—roads, chokepoints, etc.
The Cityscape—the buildings
The Service Infrastructure
The People—human terrain
The Networks—social or criminal capital
The Flows—people and things
Forms and Spaces of Governance
The Rhythm of the City
The Cyber and Electronic Layer

Table 3. Levels of Intelligence Challenges.
Inevitably, there are elements of artificiality in
such a framework, in that none of the categories is
hermetically sealed. Indeed, the problem—as the writings of Batty noted above have emphasized—is that
the city is an emerging complex system, and it is the
key interactions among the people, places, flows, and
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networks that make the city function the way it does.
Cities—like all complex systems—are much more
than the sum of their parts. Consequently, an additive
approach is wholly inadequate. Kilcullen’s colleagues
at Caerus have made a very similar point, noting that
cities are:
complex, adaptive systems due to their connectedness; their unique terrain; and the diversity of territorial controllers. These qualities lead to a high density
of interaction between the population, infrastructure,
and the physical terrain, which overwhelms traditional reductive analysis.66

The implication for the intelligence preparation for
the urban battlefield (IPB) approach articulated here
is that the notion of distinct levels of analysis or slices
of the intelligence challenge is a starting point, but
that there are important connections and interactions
among these levels that are complex and that sometimes create not only unexpected consequences but
also, on occasion, surprising developments that can
have strategic significance.
For the sake of clarity of presentation, the dimensions of IPB are presented separately. They will be followed, however, by a discussion of how the various
levels might intersect and interact with one another,
thereby adding a more holistic approach to the intelligence enterprise. It is also worth emphasizing that
the primary focus in what follows is on understanding
the city as organism. Understanding the enemy is also
vitally important; but that is something U.S. military
forces do all the time and is not discussed at length
in what follows. The emphasis here is on understanding the city as a dynamic emergent organism with
various characteristics—some of which are universal,
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while others are idiosyncratic. The deeper the understanding of the city, the more likely it is that military
units can act in ways that are copacetic with the dynamics of the city. Under some circumstances, U.S.
forces that act in this way will have a competitive
advantage over adversary forces that lack a similar
depth of understanding.
IPB Level 1: The Subterranean Dimension of Cities.
The subterranean parts of cities generally receive
little attention. Yet, some cities such as Toronto, Beijing, Rome, and London have extensive subterranean
passages and pathways. Toronto, in large part because
of the climate, has a system known as PATH, which
has been described as “a network of underground
pedestrian tunnels, elevated walkways, and at-grade
walkways connecting the office towers of Downtown
Toronto.”67 The PATH system is reportedly about 19
miles long and encompasses a massive underground
shopping complex. Rome not only has its catacombs,
but the contemporary above-ground structures typically sit on earlier structures as successive generations
simply built on the buildings beneath. London has a
massive underground system that goes well beyond
its subway system; much the same seems to be true
in Moscow. Beijing also has an underground city that
might have been used by government forces during
the Tiananmen Square massacre. Moreover, even those
cities that have grown up more recently have some
kind of underground complex of drainage and sewage systems, pipelines, and infrastructure that could
be exploited against U.S. forces in a military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity. As the Marine
Corps student handout on fighting in cities noted:
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subterranean systems are easily overlooked but can be
important to the outcome of operations. These areas
may be substantial and include subways, sewers, cellars, and utility systems. . . . The city of Los Angeles
alone has more than 200 miles of storm sewers located
under the city streets. Both attacker and defender can
use subterranean avenues to maneuver to the rear or
the flanks of an enemy. These avenues also facilitate
the conduct of ambushes, counterattacks, and infiltrations.68

Although the Marine Corps focus is largely operational and tactical, it is only necessary to think about the
tunnel system in Vietnam to recognize that the subterranean dimension of a conflict can sometimes take
on strategic significance. This was equally true in the
very different context of the Balkan wars of the early1990s. During the Serbian siege of Sarajevo in 1993,
the tunnel under the airport took on enormous strategic significance. The tunnel linked two Bosnian communities and enabled the besieged Bosnians to maintain their resistance, with “an average of 4,000 people
and 20 tons of material” moving through the tunnel
daily.69 Without the continued flow of supplies, the
outcome would have been very different. In this instance, it helped the population and forces defending
the city. Movement underground, however, can also
be used offensively. It is likely to be less vulnerable to
detection and, therefore, might enhance the capacity
for surprise, at least at the tactical level.70
The implication of all this is that if the U.S. military, for one reason or another, has to intervene in a
megacity or sub-megacity, it needs to know the extent
of the subterranean networks, the extent to which
they could be exploited by either an adversary or the
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intervening forces themselves, and the ways these
networks might be blocked or countered. One study
by military officers at the Naval Postgraduate School
even suggested that “subterranean” be regarded as an
operational environment.71 The same study noted that
“subterranean infrastructure includes: ventilation,
power supply, water supply, waste discharge, transportation, and communications,” and that these can
have multiple entry and exit points.72
It is important, therefore, to identify access points
to this subterranean infrastructure as well as to assess
the capacity to move people and things through the
underground systems. Here again, the authors noted:
mobility within a subterranean passage typically coincides with the largest item that can be conveyed
through or housed within the functional workspace.
Mobility within the subterranean environment in
terms of the maneuverability of ground forces will
ultimately determine the tactics employed. The specific assessment of mobility refers to the dimensions
of the access portal or entrance, as well as that of the
entrance tunnel. . . . The mobility attributes are defined as restricted, semi-restricted, permissive, and
unrestricted.73

The challenge is that such systems do not readily
show up on Google maps or even more sophisticated
satellite reconnaissance. Moreover, prior knowledge
might be difficult to obtain, particularly if the city is
in a country where the United States is unable to deploy more than very limited intelligence assets. This
could put U.S. forces at a significant disadvantage.
In this connection, it is worth noting a point made by
Lirio Gutierrez about the gangs in Honduras. She argued that one reason the government forces had little
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impact on the maras was that the gang members had
a much higher level of territorial knowledge than did
the government.74 For an outside intervention force in
a city that it has never been in before, the lack of local knowledge is an enormous disadvantage. As the
forces seek to mobilize and exploit friendly residents
with such local knowledge, finding people who can be
trusted and who are knowledgeable about the urban
subterranean world is vital.
IPB Level 2: The Topography of Cities.
Topography is typically defined as “the arrangement of the natural and artificial physical features of
an area.”75 In a city, the most important of these physical features are man-made. As Michael Desch noted:
urbanization changes the physical geography of an
area by increasing the density of settlement and producing built-up areas of closely spaced buildings and
tight networks of roads and rail lines.76

Yet, the underlying natural features provide both opportunities and constraints for these buildings and
transportation systems. Moreover, as Max Neiman
pointed out:
the topography and natural surroundings (rivers,
mountains, or beaches, for example) are included in
the built form of individual cities and urban settings
since they establish the contours on which and within
which structural forms occur.77

This emphasizes once again the enormous variations in
cities and raises important questions: Are the cities on
flat terrain where the built elements can be construct-
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ed easily and widely? Is the city nestled within mountains and hills, where the natural topography can be
an important differentiator among different communities with different socio-economic attributes? Certain
kinds of ridge and ravine formations within cities in
Latin America, for example, have provided spaces for
shantytowns or informal settlements that have grown
up spontaneously as economic migrants moved to the
cities because of network opportunities, or as political
refugees fled into the cities to escape rural violence.
One example is the settlement known as La Limonada
within Guatemala City, where an estimated 60,000
people have settled on land that most would consider
uninhabitable.78 This has become the largest slum in
Central America. Even more striking are the favelas of
Rio de Janeiro; many are built on mountainsides that
are so steep they can be accessed only on foot, through
narrow alleys that are the perfect places for traffickers
and gangs to ambush the incoming forces. This has
imposed serious limitations on security forces as they
have sought to pacify the favelas and contain the drug
trafficking and gang violence within them.
Similarly, if a city is littoral, what are the advantages and risks of that? Is it generally good for trade,
both licit and illicit? At the same time, there are risks
of extreme weather events that can create a humanitarian disaster. Some coastal cities might also offer attractive targets for terrorists because of the easy access
by sea. In 2008, for example, the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists came into Mumbai by sea—and were ignored
as they came ashore because they were believed to be
contraband smugglers.79 From the U.S. perspective
too, it is worth considering both the benefits and the
risks stemming from the coastal nature of a city. The
coastal component would likely be an asset for U.S.
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forces in terms of the initial entry into the city as well
facilitating a relatively easy exit strategy. At the same
time, once U.S. forces are securely in place, would it
make efforts to control and manage the city, in accordance with the overall mission, more or less difficult?
If the previous discussion emphasizes some of the
major differences among cities, some scholars have
developed a narrow but systematic approach to urban
spatial structures that could be useful if integrated into
IPB as part of a macro-level understanding of the city.
Shlomo Angel in particular has identified five discrete
attributes of every urban spatial structure that he argued could be measured and analyzed systematically
in all cities and countries. First:
urban land cover, or urban extent, is typically measured by the total built-up area (or impervious surface) of cities, sometimes including the open spaces
captured by their built-up areas and the open spaces
on the urban fringe affected by urban development.80

Second:
average urban population density is typically measured as the ratio of the total population of the city
and the total built-up area it occupies.81

Third:
centrality concerns the relative proportion of the city
population that lives in close proximity to its center
rather than in its suburban periphery.82

Fourth:
fragmentation, or scattered development, is typically
measured by the relative amount and the spatial structure of the open spaces that are fragmented by the
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noncontiguous expansion of cities into the surrounding countryside.

A fifth attribute in Angel’s typology is “compactness,
or the degree to which the city footprint approximates
a circle rather than a tentacle-like shape.” This is important because it impacts on “accessibility—the more
circular the city, the closer its locations are to its center
and to one another.”83 This notion of spatial structure
is an important dimension of urban topography.
A broad understanding of urban spatial structures
of this kind has to be supplemented by knowledge that
is more detailed at what might be termed the district
level. As suggested in the introduction of this monograph, there are massive variations in density, with
the highest density of people to spaces in areas that
are deprived socially and economically, and the lowest density among the social elites. In other words, the
average urban density can be a useful first approximation, but can also be misleading. One way to approach
this—at least as a first approximation—is to consider
the city in terms of concentric rings radiating outward
from the city center, to the peri-urban zones that mix
urban and rural elements while sometimes acting as
a focal point where new entrants to the city congregate—often in informal settlements. Operations in
areas of low density might differ in important ways
from operations in high-density urban areas.
Another approach to urban spatial structures has
been enunciated in a research paper by several scholars steeped in a complexity science approach to cities.
In their view:
the complexity of human movements has redefined
the usage of urban space and the arrangement of
resources. People, as physical carriers, motivate the
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transfer of materials, money, people, and information
between areas in urban space.84

This approach leads to an emphasis on three elements of urban spatial structure: hubs, centers, and
borders. Hubs refer to the most significant areas that
connect spaces between which urban stocks are transferred. These act within the urban structure as spatial
bridges between different neighborhoods. Centers refer to the most relevant areas that accumulate urban
stocks, which can differ from hubs but are very often
the same.85 Borders refer to socioeconomic boundaries that are generated by aggregated travel location
choices, which subdivide a city into small neighborhoods or communities.86
Using a quantitative approach with data drawn
from the use of public transport systems in Singapore,
the authors identified important trends and changes
in the city, including the move toward a “more polycentric urban form.”87
Singapore, of course, is a relatively smart city with
lots of readily available data. It also has highly efficient
transportation systems that facilitate easy movement.
In other cities, however, conditions might be different, with the topography and transportation systems
imposing constraints rather than facilitating mobility.
In considering roads in cities in the developing world,
for example, it is reasonable to expect that many of
them are narrow, with low-quality construction and
limited carrying capacity. After the 2015 earthquake
in Nepal, for example, the flow of aid and assistance
was stifled by both the limited capacity of Kathmandu
Airport and by the poor transportation into the city,
let alone to the rest of the country. Poor roads might
also be a hindrance to military operations, especially
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when there is a need for rapid response to requests
for assistance either from the civilian population or
from military units. In addition, it is critical that U.S.
forces operating in a city have a clear understanding
of the major chokepoints and how they can be avoided when operations require mobility, and how they
might be exploited when the United States is seeking
to constrain the mobility of adversaries.
IPB Level 3: Cityscapes.
Closely related to the topography, and often
considered part of it, is what might be termed the
“cityscape”—the buildings that are created as places
to live, learn, work, play, engage in commerce, or
govern. These have their own distinctive features that
have to be identified by intelligence and taken into
account in operations. As one study noted:
urban terrain, being a man-made environment, is composed of angular forms, the like of which occurs only
rarely in non-urban terrain. Not only are these forms
angular in planimetric pattern (as a grid street pattern),
but in the third dimension as well. Verticality becomes
of great importance, for this not only creates extremely
difficult barriers to assault, but provides the defense
with a man-made form of ‘high-ground.’ A large city
provides several planes of ‘urban high ground’ and, in
many instances, a subterranean level.88

Before U.S. forces move into a city, therefore, they
need to identify particular buildings that would provide good defensive positions as well as high buildings that would provide advantageous “terrain” for
sniping, ambushes, or other forms of attack on U.S.
forces. Commanders will need to know where to
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locate the “high ground” in the city, and how easy this
location will be to access, take, and maintain control
over.
The other elements of the cityscape to consider are
whether particular buildings are endowed with political, religious, or symbolic significance. After this has
been determined, it is important to develop a policy
and strategy for dealing with significant buildings.
Are certain kinds of buildings, for example, to be
regarded as no-go areas for U.S. forces? However, if
they are treated as such, and then exploited for offensive operations by an adversary or adversaries, what
does this do to the initial determination? Does U.S. occupation of certain buildings or operations in certain
parts of the city alienate the population? Conversely,
if a troop presence provides a degree of order and stability for the local population, is it then welcomed?
IPB might also consider the possibility that buildings that are contiguous will be used as a form of
manufactured tunnels, with forces operating through
them to maintain cover and avoid surveillance. During the Battle of Nablus in 2002, the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) used this approach to target high-value
Palestinian military leaders. The commander of the
Paratrooper Brigade articulated the approach in
terms of multiple perspectives on urban space and
architecture:
We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to
walk through and the door as a place forbidden to
pass through, and the window as a place forbidden
to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the
alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors.
This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this
interpretation and fall into his traps. . . . I want to
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surprise him! This is the essence of war. . . . This is why
that we opted for the methodology of moving through
walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward,
emerging at points and then disappearing.89

The result was that:
during the battle soldiers moved within the city across
hundreds of meters of ‘over ground tunnels’ carved
out through a dense and contiguous urban structure
. . . . Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets,
roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external
doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved
horizontally through walls and vertically through
holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation,’ seeks
to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as
thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through
walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the
site but also the very medium of warfare—a flexible,
almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and
in flux.90

It is not coincidental that Israeli military training and
thinking is influenced by philosophy and architecture
as well as more traditional military texts.
IPB Level 4: The Service Infrastructure.
Conceiving the city as an organism suggests that,
like human beings, cities have certain needs or requirements in order to function effectively. As one
scholar noted, “Cities require fresh water to exist.
These supplies fill a number of functions, such as human and domestic needs, commercial and industrial
purposes, street flushing, and firefighting.”91 In cities
in many developing countries, however, clean water
is not readily available:
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The lack of adequate water and sanitation facilities
leads to health issues such as diarrhea, malaria and
cholera outbreaks. Though water supply and sanitation coverage increased between 1990 and 2008, the
growth of the world’s urban populations jeopardizes
those results. While between 1990 and 2008 1052 million urban dwellers gained access to improved drinking water and 813 million to improved sanitation, the
urban population in that period grew by 1089 million
people.92

Depending on the contingency, one of the most urgent challenges for U.S. forces in a megacity might
be to provide enough uncontaminated water to keep
people alive.
Before U.S. forces engage in any kind of contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity it is essential that they
understand the infrastructure, defined broadly rather
than narrowly. Infrastructure tends to be seen in terms
of abstract forms such as power lines, water pipes,
and sewerage systems, but these have to be managed
and maintained. Indeed, services themselves require
servicing and support or they break down, or at the
very least are subject to interruption. In other words,
the conception of infrastructure in traditional terms is
not only overly narrow—it is dangerously misleading.
Services—and they can differ significantly in scope
and scale between cities in the developed world and
those in the developing world—ultimately have to
be provided by organizations and people. Knowing
where these organizations are located and how they
operate, as well as where and when they operate, is as
important as tracing the underlying physical means of
delivery.
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The implication of all this is that:
the information demands . . . will be staggering. There
are certain areas you will always need to understand
when entering an urban area—with the purpose of
then controlling it and the population. These are the
building layout and composition, transportation, electrical, sewage and water, and natural gas systems and
the locations/status of key subcomponents—bridges,
gas stations, power stations, high tension power
lines, neighborhood substations/transformers, underground sewage canals, water purification plants,
gas lines and their depth under roads (so they aren’t
crushed by your tanks).93

The more that is known prior to deployment, the
better.
If the U.S. military is dealing with the aftermath
of a natural disaster (hurricane or earthquake), then
many services will be degraded, destroyed, or disrupted, and the priority task, along with the provision
of relief supplies, will be to get them working again.
If the military is involved in a combat role, then it
should at least know where the key centers of power
and service provision are located so that it can try to
avoid collateral destruction and damage. Disruptions
of power, if they are frequent or sustained, significantly erode political legitimacy—as the United States
found to its cost in Iraq. Maintaining, protecting, or
restoring a functioning infrastructure, therefore, will
be essential in any intervention in a megacity or submegacity. In short, military forces need to know what
services are provided: by whom and to whom, the
points of origin and the places of distribution, and via
what routes and methods.
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IPB Level 5: The Inhabitants of Cities.
So far, the emphasis has been on the city as sets of
structures and services. Focusing on these, however,
does not mean that the inhabitants can be ignored. In
effect, cities are concentrated forms of human interaction as well as interactions between people and places.
Max Neiman has highlighted the importance of both
dimensions:
The social meaning of urban places refers to those cultural features of cities and urban places that reflect the
values, social perceptions, and interactions of inhabitants with regard both to the city and to one another.
Urban places that hold special religious or historical
meaning are likely to affect combatants in ways that
cities without such intensely held symbolic or nationalistic implications are not. Additionally, the levels of
social harmony or discord with respect to class conflict, ethnic antagonisms, or religious strife can affect
the unity and capacity of inhabitants to work together
effectively. Just as importantly, these characteristics
might greatly complicate the post-combat, pacification, and occupation periods. Beirut, Belfast, and the
cities in Bosnia or Kosovo are examples of how these
issues can affect combat missions in unique ways.94

Indeed, when it comes to the inhabitants of the
city, it is critical to have an understanding of the extent to which the city is cosmopolitan and integrated
on the one hand, and factionalized and segregated
on the other. Generally, a city will have very obvious
class and socio-economic differentiations that are easy
to determine. The elites live in less crowded areas, often in gated and secure communities, where violence
is low; there are neighborhoods that are not wealthy
but are a reflection of economic achievement and

56

social status; there are mixed neighborhoods that are
home to lower-middle and working-class segments
of the population; there are poor neighborhoods; and
there are areas inhabited by those who have been marginalized and excluded or expelled from the formal
economy. People in the last two groups often have
little choice but to work in the informal economy and
live in informal settlements where they have no legal
title to their houses. Any intervention in a megacity
or sub-megacity in the developing world will have to
deal with the challenge of large slums with appalling
living conditions. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
UN-Habitat Report, State of the World’s Cities, 2006/7,
noted that slums could be the “emerging human settlements of the 21st century.”95 The report also noted
that “urbanization has become virtually synonymous
with slum growth, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
Western Asia, and Southern Asia.”96 Characterized
by the lack of durable housing, sufficient living area,
access to water and sanitation, and security against
eviction, slums can be understood best in terms of
Castell’s notion of social exclusion.97 They are generally areas where the state, at best, is minimalist in the
provision of services; more often than not it is completely absent. Many of the people coming from rural
areas in search of economic opportunity will find that
they have merely traded a life of rural poverty for one
of urban destitution.
In addition to the class divisions there can be divisions based on identity politics. These divisions sometimes spillover into what is described as communal
conflict or civic conflict.98 As Stephen Graham has noted, “like other facets of global social change, political
violence is, in a sense, being urbanized.”99 There are
several dimensions of this urbanization of violence,
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one of which is the growing way in which “insurgent
and guerilla groups, rather than seeking shelter within rural proletarian groups, are colonizing the world’s
burgeoning urban spaces.”100 Another dimension concerns the tendency of clashes between rival sectarian
or religious groups to erupt or magnify in cities. In
1992, for example, an attack by Hindu militants on a
mosque in a small town called Ayodhya sparked off
inter-communal violence in many of India’s biggest
cities. “Rather than spreading through the nearby
countryside, the hatred exploded hundreds of kilometers away in Mumbai, Calcutta, Ahmedabad, and
New Delhi,” with the result that 95% of all those killed
were city dwellers.101 Similarly in Nigeria, in February
2006, the protests against the Danish cartoons of the
Prophet Mohammed sparked riots and violent clashes
between Muslim and Christian mobs in several Nigerian cities.102 In January 2007, Hezbollah supporters
brought Beirut to a halt with strikes and protests that
sparked violent clashes not only between Muslim and
Muslim, but also between Christian groups that supported rival political factions. In other words, cities
provide a concentration of everything, including animosities, rivalries, and tensions among political and
ethnic groups and factions.
Sectarian divisions between Shia and Sunni, or between Protestants and Catholics, can also create tensions and conflicts. A key dimension is the extent to
which such communities are intermingled. In some
cities, tensions are latent rather than overt, although
there is always a potential for some kind of spark to
intensify these antagonisms in ways that result in violence. The danger is that military intervention is rarely
neutral. As became evident in Iraq, when external intervention changes the internal power structure, those
who have suddenly become disadvantaged seek to
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restore the status quo ante, while those who have gone
from a position of subordination to primacy want to
exploit their newfound power for retribution against
those who previously held power. The result was a
period of sectarian cleansing in Baghdad that resulted
in the number of residential quarters that mixed Sunni
and Shia residents dropping from 56 in 2006 to 21 in
2007.103 During the same period, 14 Sunni neighborhoods increased to 23, and the number of Shia residential quarters—reflecting the effectiveness of the
Mahdi Army operations—went from 17 to 41.104
In other words, U.S. military involvement in a
megacity or sub-megacity almost invariably has the
potential for sparking a tinderbox. Prior to intervention, therefore, it is important to understand what the
cleavages or potential cleavages might be, as well as
how different factions or groups might perceive the
intervention. It is also critical to send in soldiers and
support workers with appropriate language skills;
the complexity of the language challenge should not
be underestimated. As Jeff Watson noted, “megacities are largely multilingual. While this can be said of
large cities in general, the scale of multilingualism in
megacities magnifies its effects.”105 In New York City:
nine foreign languages are spoken by communities of
one hundred thousand or larger. Language also plays
a role in determining one’s identity and the larger language community in which one decides to live.106

The problem is intensified by local dialects and regional languages within countries. In India—a country of
ethnolinguistic states—Hindi and English are accompanied by many ethno-regional languages that people
bring from the countryside into the major cities. It is
vital to understand such nuances prior to deployment
to a megacity or sub-megacity:
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Understanding the regional languages within a megacity will have practical implications for creating appropriate pre-deployment language and culture familiarization training, identifying reach-back capabilities,
and building an effective military and host-nation
interpreter cadre.107

Such skills will also be important during the deployment:
A clear understanding of the multilingual information
flows within a megacity will help military decision
makers better understand how language communities
prefer to receive and share information. These data
will provide insight into how to most effectively communicate with friendly forces or interrupt and manipulate the communication of enemy forces.108

By adding both depth and subtlety of understanding,
an enhanced linguistic capability will greatly enhance
all aspects of intelligence and operations in megacities
and sub-megacities, including the understanding of
governance.
IPB Level 6: Networks.
Language skills are indispensable in a military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity because they
facilitate the identification of all kinds of social, political, economic, family, tribal, or ethnic networks. Indeed, networks come in all varieties, differing in size,
shape, membership, cohesion, and purpose. They can
vary from small-truncated localized networks that can
be important only within the confines of a small district within the city, to some with citywide reach and
importance, to those with a national and even transna-
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tional reach. Networks can also be centrally directed
or highly decentralized, they can have amorphous or
specific objectives, and they can be restricted or open
in their membership. They can operate through faceto-face meetings or—because of technology—can be
much more dispersed, but still effective. Networks
facilitate flows of information, knowledge, and communication as well as more tangible commodities.
Consequently, it is important for U.S. forces coming into a megacity or sub-megacity to have some idea
about the most important networks and the underlying affiliations that give them a high degree of trust
and cohesion. Who are the most important policymakers in the city? How much of their influence depends
on social and business connections? How are the policymakers integrated in the broader political and economic elite? Are they part of larger family, kinship,
tribal, or ethnic networks? How do these networks
overlap and intersect? If there are distinct networks, to
what extent do these networks cooperate or compete
with one another? How powerful are these networks,
and what is their ability to mobilize forces either to
work with or against the U.S. military forces that have
been deployed to the city?
A second level of questions about networks moves
from the general understanding of the network size,
shape, structure, and influence to more specific and
focused questions about the key nodes and connections within the network. Nodes that are highly trusted and, therefore, particularly influential in shaping
opinion will need to be co-opted where possible by
U.S. forces. In addition, the contingency force will
need to be particularly sensitive to and careful in
dealing with networks that have a particular historical, cultural, or religious significance. Failure by the
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Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to appreciate
the status of the al-Sadr family in Baghdad and to
treat Muqtada al-Sadr as an important network node
in the Shia community in the city and, therefore, as an
important stakeholder in post-invasion Iraq, proved
to be very costly. By marginalizing al-Sadr, the CPA
needlessly created an additional adversary. In effect,
al-Sadr and his movement became an illicit power
structure, albeit one that continued to be an important
social movement and welfare provider.
In addition to the formal networks, there are also
likely to be a series of shadow networks in the city: the
fixers, the arms dealers, the smugglers, the organized
crime figures, as well as political extremists. Indeed,
the underworld networks might be as important as
those that operate in the open. It is important, therefore, to identify those nodes within the network that
are particularly important—either because they provide leadership, they offer particular skills that are
indispensable to the organization, or they are boundary spanners and key connectors with the licit world.
Moreover, it is necessary to determine the extent to
which the continued operation of these networks is
compatible with the mission of U.S. military forces in
the city. If there is broad compatibility, then a strategy
of co-option might be more effective than a strategy of
confrontation. Attempting to disrupt and degrade a
criminal network could prove to be highly disruptive
for the city and, therefore, counterproductive to the
attainment of the mission objectives.
The other kinds of networks that are important in
cities are spatial networks, and recent scholarship on
cities has given these networks a far more prominent
place than in the past. Batty, for example, one of the
most prominent scholars in the uses of complexity sci-
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ence as a way to understand cities, treats networks as
a core element in his work. As one assessment noted:
Complexity theory . . . rejects the top-down, comprehensive, and structural approaches of traditional planning practice. Instead, there is a focus on bottom-up,
organically structured activities that shape and influence urban systems. Complexity theory also rejects
steady state assumptions about cities in place of a nonequilibrium perspective.109

Building on these premises, Batty regards networks
as the “physical containers whose capacity constrains
flows of energy and information, manifested as materials, people, or ideas.”110 Moreover, those energy
flows provide another, closely interlinked, focus for
IPB.
IPB Level 7: The Flows.
Scholars such as David Held, one of the major theorists of globalization, have emphasized that one of the
most salient features of globalization is the vast flow of
people, money, commodities, information, messages,
digital signals, and services around the world.111 What
Manuel Castells termed the “space of flows” has become a global space.112 Cities too have become spaces
of flows. Global cities in particular are often defined by
the flows of money and information to other cities. Yet,
even cities that do not have this status have all sorts of
flows. Some of the flows differ in intensity at different
times, but such things as food, water, commodities,
people, money, vehicles, information, and services all
flow constantly. There are flows into the city, flows
around the city, flows through the city, and flows out
of the city. Moreover, there are licit and highly benefi63

cial flows that are important to maintain and protect,
but there are also illicit flows of guns, drugs, contraband, and even trafficked people that it is important
to block or interdict. One of the priorities for the IPB
in relation to military contingencies in megacities and
sub-megacities is to map and understand these flows.
This includes points of origin, length, duration, intensity, direction, and route, as well as pulses within the
flows. Those attributes of the city that facilitate flows
and those that constrict or inhibit them must also be
considered.
At a very mundane level, one of the most important of these flows is transportation. Movement of
people through the city is often very congested, especially during certain peak hours. As one study noted:
the streets of the city serve a wide variety of interrelated purposes: as axes for the movement of people,
goods, and vehicles; as public areas separating enclosed private spaces and providing the essential
spatial frame of reference for the city as a whole; as
areas for recreation, social interaction, the diffusion of
information, waiting, resting . . . and as locations for
economic activities. . . . Within the functional complexity of the street environment, the street occupations
are both strongly influenced by changes in other environmental factors, and also contributors to general
environmental conditions. Thus, for example, streettraders and small-scale transporters depend upon the
direction, density, velocity, and flexibility of potential
customers’ movements, and are immediately affected
by changes in traffic flows and consumer behavior. At
the same time, they influence patterns of movement
and overall levels of congestion . . .113

This description highlights two interrelated aspects of
flows: the first is their complexity and their interaction with both people and places; the second is that
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disruption or even abrupt changes in flows can have
significant consequences in terms of businesses and
livelihoods. The second aspect in particular needs to
be factored into any intelligence products about any
megacity or sub-megacity that the United States might
find itself operating within. Even if the United States
goes in with a high degree of legitimacy, actions that
are poorly thought out in relation to flows can rapidly
create disaffection and disillusion among the populace
in ways that could make the operational environment
much more difficult for the United States.
There is a conundrum here—although the extent
of it depends in large part on the nature of the contingency. One of the challenges of dealing with illicit
flows is that they are often deeply embedded within
licit flows. The issue, therefore, is how to detect and
interdict flows such as arms or drugs without seriously disrupting the normal legitimate flows. There
is an inescapable tradeoff here. Nevertheless, it is important that the costs and benefits be weighed prior
to any major action that might interrupt normal flows
that are a natural part of the functioning of the city.
One way to think about the issue is that the military
force in the city should operate, if not as an “invisible
hand,” then at least as a facilitator of city flows and
functions, rather than as an inhibitor of or impediment to these flows.
The other important element in relation to flows
is the need to maintain and protect them. This is true
whether it is flows of services and power, of people,
or of goods and vehicles. It is important, therefore,
to identify points of vulnerability in flows. One clear
point of vulnerability—and a very attractive target
for attack—is a transportation hub, particularly one
in which different kinds of flows converge; another is
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at the final distribution point. The number of terrorist
attacks in Baghdad that occur at markets is indicative
of the importance of the distribution point. Not only
are such attacks relatively easy to mount, but they also
kill innocent civilians and strike at the flows of daily
necessities.
If the intervention in the city is an effort at disaster
management, then the issue will be one of restoring
the flows. Once the immediate search and rescue operations are complete and a degree of order restored,
priority has to be given to the restoration of flows.
Even if these are initially partial, incomplete, and at
significantly lower levels than prior to the disaster,
getting them reignited will be an important step on
the road back to recovery and normality.
IPB Level 8: Governance in Cities.
Governance in cities is responsible for maintaining flows and networks of goods, services, people,
traffic, information, and communication that are indispensable for the continued health and well-being
of the city—as poor as these might be. Governance
provides a superstructure that in effect facilitates the
natural functions and flows of the city. It is also concerned about the control of violence and maintenance
of order. Unfortunately, much of the literature on urban governance is really about governance in a select
set of cities in North America, Europe, and Japan that
are increasingly likely to fall into the smart city category. One scholar, for example, identified four different ideal types of approaches to urban governance:
the managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare
models.114 Yet, for both fragile and feral states, the
issue is less likely to be about the type of governance
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and more about the paucity of governance. In many
cities in the developing world, there are both capacity gaps and functional holes, with the state and the
city government failing to provide either social control mechanisms or even basic services. Moreover, city
governance, like state governance, is often corrupt, ineffective, and patchy at best. It is not surprising, therefore, that bottom-up or organic governance mechanisms emerge as a substitute for state governance.115
This is both positive and negative. It is positive in that
it provides some degree of order, limited but real economic opportunities, and some rudimentary services;
it is negative in that the providers are often criminal
organizations, which use paternalism as a means of
enhancing their own security and aggrandizement.
This phenomenon is visible in the Cape Flats in South
Africa, where, as André Standing has noted, “the
criminal economy delivers employment and goods to
thousands of individuals who are socially excluded,”
while the “criminal elite provides . . . ‘governance
from below’ . . . by performing functions traditionally
associated with the state.”116 These functions include
dispute settlement, a degree of social protection, and
even private philanthropy, which is at least a partial
substitute for the state provision of welfare.117 If anything, the phenomenon is equally if not more striking
in the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, where the “dons”
provide employment, services, and protection. The
provision of these collective goods, of course, results
not from altruism but self-interest as criminals seek
to mobilize public support and thereby enhance their
own legitimacy and security. Even so, criminal paternalism has provided benefits to communities long
ignored by the state, and at times this informal governance has become more important than formal gov-
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ernance. Sometimes there might even be tacit agreement whereby the state provides some services while
criminals or other violent armed groups provide other
services. This results in a form of mixed or hybrid governance, well described by Enrique Desmond Arias in
his study of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.118
Even though violent armed groups—militias,
criminals, insurgents, terrorists, revolutionaries—
might provide alternative forms of governance, they
also tend to be in competition with one another for
territorial control, and for the control of markets, both
licit and illicit. At times spaces within the city are bitterly contested as rival groups vie for supremacy; at
other times or in other parts of the city the struggle is
between the forces of the state and these violent armed
groups, resulting in confrontational spaces. Given this
diversity, one way to think about spaces within the
city is in terms of governance and conflict. Prior to
U.S. military involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity, it would be extremely useful to identify differing
elements of both governance and conflict. This could
actually be done in terms as indicated in the following matrix using the dimensions of governance and its
providers, and conflict and who the belligerents are.
Table 4 yields the following typology of spaces within
cities.
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Formally Governed
Spaces—where the
state is dominant

Hybrid Governed
Spaces—by mix of both
state and armed groups

Alternatively Governed
Spaces—where an armed
group dominates

Confrontational
Spaces—between the
state and violent armed
groups

Multilayered Conflict
Spaces—that are both
confrontational and
contested

Contested Spaces—
among violent armed
groups

Table 4. Types of Spaces within Cities.
Although this might appear rather abstract—and
certainly has qualities of an ideal type—it does facilitate an understanding of the variety of urban (and for
that matter non-urban) spaces that the United States is
likely to encounter in any operation in a megacity or
sub-megacity. Some areas of major cities in the Northern Triangle of Central America, for example, are under the control of government forces (i.e., the police
and military); some are under the control of a particular gang (such as MS-13 or Barrio 18); some “enjoy”
the benefits of a mixed form of governance, in which a
gang and government forces tacitly share responsibility; some are the scene of direct confrontation between
the state and gangs over control; others are the venue
for contests between MS-13 and Barrio 18, each of
whom seeks exclusive control; and some are the subject of a three-way (or more) conflict in which gangs
are fighting one another while also fighting the state.
There is an added twist to all this. If urban areas
have a range of actors vying for limited resources and
providing varying levels of governance, military operations in such areas become, de facto, an additional
and novel level of governance. At a minimum, therefore, understanding the existing patterns of governance and the networks that provide them is essential
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to the success of contingency operations in megacities
and sub-megacities. It is equally important to develop
procedures for intersecting smoothly and effectively
with these networks, both formal and informal, thereby supplementing rather than superseding or disrupting them. There will be occasions, however, when the
external military force will be seen as a threat and an
additional player in an already multilayered conflict.
In these circumstances, it will have no choice but to
resort to violence.
IPB Level 9: The Rhythms of Cities.
One dimension that has been given little attention
with regard to the possibility of a military intervention in a megacity is the relationship between space
and time. Almost every movie or television series set
within a large city gives attention to what is sometimes described as the “pulse of the city,” a recognition that the city is constantly transforming and reconstituting itself each day with inward and outward
flows of traffic, people, commodities, etc. However,
the notion goes beyond this: time is related to business interactions and social engagements in the city,
and even has a bearing on safety. The question of who
controls the city at night, for example, is a manifestation of the time-space relationship, and the imposition
of a curfew is no more than an emphatic, if occasionally overly dramatic, acknowledgement of the critical
interplay between time, space, and certain kinds of activities. The Swedish scholar Torsten Hägestrand even
developed a concept of time geography that sought
to link place and time in terms of the interweaving
of people’s lives. Although some urban scholars see
Hägestrand’s work as an early attempt to link place
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and time, the pioneer of rhythm analysis is widely regarded as Henri Lefebvre, who enunciated ideas related to the rhythm of life—including the rhythm of the
city. While some of the concepts and language of the
time-space relationship take on an abstract or metaphysical quality, the notion is ultimately very simple:
it is necessary to think about time and space together
rather than in isolation from one another. As Lefebvre
noted:
concrete times have rhythms, or rather are rhythms—
and all rhythms imply the relation of a time to a space,
a localized time, or, if one prefers, a temporalized
space. Rhythm is always linked to such and such a
place, to its place, be that the heart, the fluttering of
the eyelids, the movement of a street or the tempo of
a waltz.119

As one scholar noted, the great strength of this perspective is to avoid “the conception of place as static,
for rhythms are essentially dynamic, part of the multiplicity of flows that emanate from, pass through and
center upon place, and contribute to its situated dynamics.”120 Instead, it offers a “temporal understanding of place and space.”121 One aspect of these rhythms
is that there is often repetition in both time and space—
daily rush hours, for example—but not identical repetition. As Lefebvre acknowledged, “there is always
something new and unforeseen that introduces itself
into the repetitive.”122 This recognizes that cities are
complex emergent systems, constantly changing and
adapting. Indeed, as one scholar observed:
rhythm analysis can help explore notions that places
are always in a process of becoming, seething with
emergent properties, but usually stabilized by regu-
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lar patterns of flow that possess particular rhythmic
qualities whether steady, intermittent, volatile or
surging.123

Rhythms are in large part about the timing of
flows, the speed with which they pass through particular locations. Yet, they are also about routines and
intersections. As one scholar noted:
familiar places are the unquestioned settings for
daily tasks, pleasures and rhythmically apprehended
routines, with regular patterns of walking, driving,
shopping and other routinized practices as part of
familiar spatio-temporal experience. These patterns
are marked by regular paths and points of spatial and
temporal intersection which routinize action in space
and collectively constitute the time-geographies . . .
within which people’s trajectories separate and cross
in regular ways. Shops, bars, cafes, garages and so
forth are meeting points at which individual paths
congregate, providing geographies of communality
and continuity within which social activities are cocoordinated and synchronized. This ongoing mapping
of space through repetitive, collective choreographies
of congregation, interaction, rest and relaxation produce situated rhythms through which time and space
are stitched together to produce what Seamon (1980)
calls ‘place ballets.’124

One task of IPB is to understand these “choreographies of congregation,” especially when they might
represent or produce not communality and continuity
but violence and dislocation. Another is to consider
how accepted rhythms might be disrupted, either deliberately by those who want to bring about change
or inadvertently by actions of U.S. forces that are
based on an inadequate understanding of the dominant rhythms of the city they are operating in. Indeed,

72

Lefebvre discussed the creation of arrhythmia. To go
back to commuting, minor cases of arrhythmia could
result from minor accidents that block traffic and extend the length of rush hour far beyond the norm.
More serious cases could result from deliberate sabotage or blocking of transportation arteries, especially
bridges or roads, or from military operations by an
intervening force that are badly timed and block the
normal flows. Moreover, within megacities there will
almost certainly be groups and individuals “who are
often spatially segregated, and marginal to the life and
dominant rhythms of the city.”125 Sometimes they simply want to opt out. There are also instances that they
become so alienated that they seek revenge or recompense. Some of the maras in the major cities of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala have sought to make
money and exert power by extorting transportation
companies and drivers, and at times by violent attacks
on buses. In effect, they are seeking to exercise power
through the creation of arrhythmia.
The other dimension of rhythm that has particular relevance to military contingencies in megacities
is the difference between the rhythms of the day and
those of the night. For any contingency force, controlling the rhythms of the night (at least in key areas)
will be highly desirable, if somewhat difficult. U.S.
military forces, however, can also seek to exploit the
different rhythms of the night, taking actions with
impunity that, in daytime, might create arrhythmia.
Understanding the rhythms of the city, synchronizing
with these rhythms and moving in the direction of the
prevailing flows rather than against them, limits the
footprint of the contingency force, minimizes disruption, and reduces the prospects of alienating large segments of the urban population.

73

IPB Layer 10: The Cyber Dimension.
Treating cyberspace as an additional target of intelligence is relatively novel; yet, cyberspace has to
be included in a comprehensive approach to IPB for
megacities and sub-megacities. Cyberspace and what
Jeff Boleng and Colin Clarke term the “New ‘Net”
have become both an extension of the battlefield and
a window on the battlefield. Nowhere is this more relevant than in urban military contingencies. Although
cyberspace is sometimes regarded as a fifth operational domain of warfare, it is more. It permeates society,
economics, politics, culture, and increasingly, warfare.
It is part of the context within which military operations have to be conducted, yet also provides insights
into both conditions in a megacity and the adversaries operating there. As one study noted, “megacities
function at the intersection of the physical, social and
cyber spaces”126 and, therefore, should be treated as
information hubs.
Other research that has been done completely outside the military context makes a very similar point,
focusing on what is termed the “data city” and developing “methods and tools to collect, analyze, and
represent time-based geo-located social media data at
the urban scale.”127
This concept of the data city builds on the earlier
work of scholars who developed concepts such as
“mediascape” or “informational landscape,” and “offered descriptions that combine traditional city representations with new informational membranes hovering above urban fabrics.”128 Indeed:
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the underlying idea of these approaches is to view the
urban experience as tied to the multiple, fragmented,
and temporary layers of data and information generated by human-place interactions. This is what we
define as the data city. These data can be produced
either collectively or by the individual; they can be
aggregated or discrete, open or protected. They constitute observation points that allow the interpretation
and description of behavioral patterns within specific
temporal and spatial coordinates.129

The data city “presents itself with an unprecedented
quantity of information in the form of geo-located
comments from Twitter” and other social media.130
This fragmented proliferation of information generated by urban inhabitants offers potential benefits
both for the research community and urban decisionmakers, who can use the data to generate broad and
analytical visions of the uses of urban space.131

The basic notion is that citizens with smartphones
have become mobile sensors, reporting on events in
the city with tweets, photos, messages, and the like.
This transforms human beings into potential ‘sensors’
that not only have the ability to process and interpret
what they feel and think but also to geographically localize the information (sometimes involuntarily) and
spread it globally through the Internet, thus drawing
people-generated landscapes.132

This notion of “the informational membrane hovering
above urban fabrics”133 is particularly useful and emphasizes how the data city can feed directly into IPB.
There are, of course, differences between smart cities of the developed world and fragile or feral cities
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in the global south. In cities in the developed world,
much of the reporting includes geolocation and timestamps, thereby providing unprecedented opportunities for time geography. Even without analyzing the
content, the volume and intensity of tweets and messages can provide insights on the “choreographies of
congregation” described above in the discussion of the
rhythm of cities. Moreover, Paolo Ciuccarelli, Giorgia
Lupi, and Luca Simeone also provide a series of:
spatial aggregations based on social media. Areas
were defined and colored according to the time period
of the day with the highest level of contributions from
the users. We compared weekdays, weekends, and a
special week [with a major event].134

The results were striking examples of time geography,
highlighting the rhythm of the city at different times
and on different days of the week.
Cities in the developing world are also very rich
information environments, although sometimes with
less geolocation data, since the predominant mobile
phones are feature phones rather than smartphones.
This might change in the future as developers seek to
give feature phones at least some of the capabilities of
smartphones. Even without this, however, the “information membrane” hovering above cities in the developing world offers both challenges and opportunities.
The challenges, according to Boleng and Clarke, stem
in part from the fact that:
the data content produced, consumed, and exchanged
in this new network will be largely voice, images, and
video. Significant content will also be exchanged as
traditional text via SMS, but it will be multi-lingual
slang and leetspeak.135
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The sheer volume of unstructured data adds further
complications, as does:
the transient nature of the network itself, both in
terms of connectivity and participation. Reliance on
battery power and the difficulty of recharging phones
in slums where infrastructure is fragile, expensive,
and often non-existent have created an environment
where users power off phones when not in use. This
creates a highly dynamic network with mobile devices
disappearing from one location and reappearing in
another.136

Such problems notwithstanding, this remains a rich
environment that provides opportunities for understanding cities and their dynamics.
This point has been emphasized by Robert Dixon,
who sees the urban environment as extremely rich for
intelligence gathering and analysis, by new as well
as traditional means. Dixon has argued, though, that
“the Army’s current approach to learning about this
environment is to seek the diamonds scattered amidst
this clutter,” when in fact:
the clutter itself is the jewel. Enormous amounts of
readily available data can reveal more about a city,
its population, and the nefarious actors residing there
than we could have imagined before. To truly understand this environment the Army must fundamentally
change its approach to understanding the environment: It must adopt a holistic approach enabled by big
data analytics.137

This would offer an opportunity to do a deep analysis
of correlated and anomalous data, and discover what
people actually do, thereby developing “previously
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unimaginable insight into modern urban ecology.”138
Dixon has also noted, “the Army currently lacks the
resources, expertise, approaches, or seemingly even
the desire to investigate and exploit the reservoir of
information available in modern cities. This must
change.”139 Certainly, the use of big data needs to
be fully integrated into institutional learning. This
should go hand in hand with a complexity approach
that avoids “one-dimensional thinking and reductive
hypotheses.”140 Such approaches are indispensable.
Nevertheless, it is important not to oversell them and
ignore the possibility that there might still be problems with noise and clutter, as well as adversary denial and deception.
The other problem when dealing with cyberspace
in relation to megacity contingencies is that adversaries can exploit the almost automatic transparency that
it creates—both to show U.S. forces in a bad light and
their own actions very positively. Consequently, part
of IPB prior to any action in a megacity or sub-megacity must be to identify the service providers for both
telecommunications and the Internet. It is also important to identify online opinion-makers who could have
a major impact in any controversy over U.S. military
intervention.
Implications.
These 10 layers have been presented here in linear
fashion and as separate and distinct categories. In reality, however, they are interdependent, characterized
by all sorts of interactions and intersections, many of
which are difficult to predict or prepare for. The idea
of a city as an evolving and emerging complex system
that is far more than the sum of its parts encapsulates
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the notion of these interactions. Change in one area,
for example, can create all sorts of feedback loops,
some of which act as amplifiers and others as dampeners. The problem with amplifiers in particular is that
they can create consequences that cascade through the
system, often with a highly disruptive impact. This is
why small changes in complex systems can have large
consequences, which sometimes create unexpected
tipping points.
Given all this, it is critical that the U.S. Army create
some kind of center or institutional forum for urban
intelligence and analysis. For the sake of convenience,
it is described here as an Urban Analysis Center. The
exact form will depend on available resources and the
depth and endurance of the commitment to prepare
for contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities.
Nevertheless, the center should be guided by several
principles.
The first is that a carefully selected and relatively
small core of military officers, urban scholars, and
intelligence analysts should be designated with the
responsibility to provide a sense of vision, central
leadership, continuity, and an ever-expanding repository of knowledge about urbanization in general, and
specific megacities and sub-megacities in particular.
An inter-disciplinary mix is critical; it should include
urban planners, architects, and structural engineers as
well as military officers and intelligence specialists.
Second, rather than the Urban Analysis Center
having a large permanent staff, it should be run as a
network designed to have a powerful surge capability when required. In other words, the core leadership
could identify scholars, urban planners, and journalists with particular specialties and country and city
expertise to become part of a constantly adapting and
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pulsating network with a high degree of adaptation
and agility. There is a reasonably good model for this.
Over the last decade or so, the intelligence community has created an outreach program in which people
outside the community were designated originally as
National Intelligence Council Associates, and more
recently as Intelligence Community Associates. The
intelligence community could then call on the associates for conference participation, analytic papers, and
the like. The scheme did not require security clearances, because most of the work could be completed with
open-source analysis. Since most of the information
about cities would also be in the unclassified domain,
this could operate on the same principle. The Urban
Analysis Center, by bringing the associates together
in periodic conferences with specific goals—ranging
from enhanced understanding of urban dynamics to
accumulating in-depth knowledge about a specific
city—could create over time a sense of community
and trust that would greatly strengthen the network
and increase its value to the Center and to the Army.
The third principle is that provision be made for
crisis management and direct communications with
military units in the event of a military contingency in
a megacity. Not only should the Urban Analysis Center have a communications capability allowing direct
support for operations in any urban environment, but
also a capacity for increased staffing and support in a
crisis. Indeed, the Center could bring in particular outside experts with specific expertise related to the target
city or particular elements within it, such as terrain,
flows, and networks. There would then be a capacity
for the operating units to reach back to the Center for
technical expertise (on such matters as infrastructure),
political analysis (relating to the networks of influence
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within the city), or criminological assessments (dealing, for example, with the major criminal organizations and criminal markets). The request could also go
the other way, with Center personnel requesting information—that could be in multi-media form—that
could assist in sense making and result in feedback
to units in the city that would enhance situational
awareness.
The fourth principle is that the Center becomes
a focus of institutional learning and adaptation. It
would take the lead in compiling the lessons learned
after any contingency and turn these into a set of best
practices. Moreover, this could be done as a living
document constantly being updated and refined. In
fact, there could be both a formal version and one that
is treated as a “Wiki” and open to contributions from
military personnel with experience in urban combat
as well as academics and urban planners. An opensource approach of this kind would offer some exciting new possibilities and could prove to be extremely
creative and rewarding.
In other words, the Center would have a wide
range of tasks and responsibilities, ranging from longterm strategic assessments of particular cities, to shortterm operational and tactical support to the battlefield
level. It would be engaged in IPB and intelligence
provision on the battlefield; it would also make great
use of Google Earth and particular software packages
that allow systematic monitoring of geolocated social
media. The information membrane discussed above
as part of the cyber-layer could be a particularly rich
source of information not simply for mining, but also
for informing decision-making at all levels—from the
battlefield to the highest political and military leadership. In short, the Urban Analysis Center would be
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an invaluable asset in any military contingency in a
megacity or sub-megacity. Indeed, to engage in such
a contingency without this kind of support center
would be reckless.
PREPARING FOR MEGACITY OPERATIONS
The U.S. military has had a variety of experiences
in various urban environments, some successful, some
not. These have ranged from full-intensity conflicts
such as World War II or, more recently, Fallujah and
Sadr City, all the way to operations other than conflict,
such as the Los Angeles riots of 1992 or the deployment of National Guard troops to Ferguson, Missouri,
in August 2014. In addition, military forces have been
deployed in response to hurricanes in New Orleans
in 2005 and New York City in 2012. The lessons from
these experiences have been invaluable, and they
provide a solid foundation for future contingencies.
Nevertheless, military involvement in megacities and
sub-megacities will present new and extremely formidable challenges and problems. Success will require
unique and innovative solutions, rather than simply
scaled-up versions of traditional tactics and methods.
Consequently, equipment, personnel, tactics, and doctrine must be developed in ways that provide the U.S.
Army with effective military capabilities and with discrete options that are tailored to the environment and
can be executed with minimal damage and disruption
(see Figure 1).
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Network of
Systems, i.e.,
"The Flow"

Figure 1. Developments Needed for Military
Involvement in Megacities and Sub-Megacities.
Military operations in dense urban terrain require
new mindsets. While the Army has already highlighted the role of the individual infantryman in an urban
environment, and his or her ability as a front-line
intelligence gatherer or as an extension of American
diplomacy, more will be required. Not only are the
unique difficulties of urban terrain likely to increase
dramatically in a megacity, but also they will require
significant changes in the organizational structure
and operating doctrines of the Army. Moreover, they
necessitate going beyond rules of engagement for the
use of force, to the development and understanding of
rules of interaction. Winning respect will be achieved
as much through friendly encounters with the civilian population as through hostile encounters with
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enemy combatants. Against this background, Figure
2 outlines the framework for operating in a megacity
environment. The pre-kinetic mindset includes understanding the battlefield, doctrinal changes, and the
overall mission scope. The kinetic battlefield is covered later within the tactical considerations. Finally,
the post-kinetic is essentially the re-establishment of
effective governance and the prevention of a regression to the kinetic phase of combat. Figure 2 illustrates
this mindset.

Pre-Kinetic
•
IPB
•
Training & Equipment
•
Doctrinal Changes
•
Mission

Kinetic
•
Traditional Urban
Concerns
•
Megacity-Centric
Concerns
•
IPB Concerns
•
Changing Battlefield

Post-Kinetic
•
Governance
•
Prevent a return to
the Kinetic

Figure 2. The Pre-Kinetic, Kinetic,
and Post-Kinetic Battlefield.
Highlighting the Network of Systems.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that cities
are highly variegated entities that almost invariably
contain a mixture of functional and dysfunctional elements; formal, informal, and mixed governance mechanisms; and areas of low and high violence. Moreover,
each city has its own unique fingerprint or genetic
coding that needs to be identified and understood.
A military intervention in a city—for whatever rea-
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son—adds an additional layer of turbulence and complexity. At the same time, military operations in such
areas become, de facto, an additional and novel level
of governance. At a minimum, therefore, understanding the existing patterns of governance and the networks that provide them is essential to the success of
contingency operations in megacities and sub-megacities. Just as it is essential to understand networks of
influence, it is equally important to understand networks of governance and develop procedures to intersect smoothly and effectively with these networks, in
effect, supplementing rather than superseding them.
One way to think about this is the notion of a military force in the city operating, if not as an “invisible
hand,” then at least as a facilitator of city functions
rather than as an inhibitor or impediment to these
functions. If the intervention in the city is an effort at
disaster management then the role will be much more
active and visible, but will still need to display some
of the same sensitivities.
Other governance concerns during both the prekinetic and the kinetic phase include the complex nature of operating in an urban area in which a myriad
of actors and agents with overlapping responsibilities
compete for limited resources. As Russell Glenn concisely stated:
A coalition operating in such a region would find itself
coordinating with hundreds of administrative jurisdictions: political, fire, law enforcement, transportation, and health to touch on a few, this regardless of
whether the mission at hand involves armed force or
not. Nor would opposing force’s evacuation of an urban area guarantee relief. Removal of what might well
have been coercive authorities too typical of the Third
World removes the lid from a simmering pot; looting,
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surging criminality, and latent sectarianism could be
only three of the . . . rewards for assuming responsibility.141

In other words, the military forces have to be prepared
for surprises of all kinds and, in response, have to be
highly adaptive in developing effective mitigation
strategies.
Understanding the Battlefield.
Urban Terrain as an Operational Minefield.
Operating in dense urban terrain is similar to operating in an extensive minefield. A minefield is of
concern to a battlefield commander because it slows
operational tempo and funnels forces, thereby increasing vulnerability to an adversary exploiting such
developments. Yet, a minefield also affects not only local commerce and governance but also the surrounding populace. Operating in or near a minefield is rife
with hazards, and the solutions to clearing a minefield range from the very destructive—with attendant
drawbacks, such as making the land unusable for
commerce or agriculture—to a methodical approach
using specialized equipment and personnel with an
understanding of both the dynamics and the impact
of the action. Similarly, a megacity or sub-megacity is
an inhospitable environment that not only reduces operational tempo, but also is rife with the possibility of
unintended consequences and catastrophic mistakes.
As such, it requires specialized equipment, highly
trained soldiers and specialists, flexible doctrines, and
adaptive operations. Just as military formations and
other institutions must adapt to operating in a minefield, so must the Army and civilian institutions adapt
for expeditionary urban operations.
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Throughout the last century, military forces frequently engaged in urban combat, albeit often reluctantly, viewing it as an unwelcome deviation from
more critical maneuver-orientated missions. Yet,
armies maneuvering in the field cannot overcome the
fact that urban areas are often the center of gravity for
enemy forces, whether standing armies or sophisticated terrorist networks. Of greater concern is the acceleration of urbanization, especially in the developing world, which not only increases the likelihood of
military operations being conducted in urban terrain,
but also ensures that the battlefield will be densely
populated. Civilians will no longer be mere bystanders able to be circumvented or avoided, but an integral
component of the battlefield. Consequently, whether
facing sophisticated armies and air forces or smaller,
highly-mobile, non-traditional enemies, urban terrain
dictates not only a shift in traditional utilization of
military resources but also a greater understanding of
those factors likely to impact military operations. In
this connection, the urban environment has physical,
social, and political attributes that impact military operations and, therefore, need to be examined.
Physical.
Urban terrain reduces the advantage for the attackers while providing significant benefits for the
defenders. As the Russians discovered in Grozny, maneuvering in urban terrain—even with massive firepower superiority and modern equipment—can lead
to ambushes that inflict considerable losses.142 Cover
and concealment is readily available to the defender,
negating the advantages of long-range weaponry by
precluding the use of many ground-based line-of-sight
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systems. In addition, most modern cities, including
some megacities and sub-megacities, have extensive
sewer systems or subway systems that can be utilized
in conjunction with travel within buildings to maneuver out of sight of the attacker or occupying forces.143
Consequently, most battles take place at close
range, rendering air power and artillery far less relevant. Moreover, some opponents will intentionally
“hug” friendly units or civilians to prevent or inhibit
the utilization of heavier firepower.144 Traditional
reliance on air power is also difficult, as low-flying
aircraft are highly vulnerable to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which can be easily concealed within a large urban environment. In light of
this, many of the advantages usually enjoyed by the
U.S. military, such as high-tech long-range weaponry,
are likely to be negated in dense urban environments.
The physical geography of urban terrain necessitates centralized planning but decentralized execution.145 Lower-level noncommissioned officers and
lower enlisted troops play a critical role in relaying the
senior commander’s intent and objectives, especially
in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT)—operations in which units are widely scattered and require devolved leadership.146 However, having such
decentralized command structures inhibits the concentration of forces when needed, and can also lead to
a loss of discipline. This in turn increases the chance
of actions that might be counterproductive to the operation. The Mahmudiyah killings in Iraq—in which
American soldiers from the 502nd regiment of the U.S.
Army gang-raped and killed a 14-year-old girl and
murdered her family—are a case in point.147
In the final analysis, the physical layout of urban
terrain, in conjunction with its benefits to the enemy,
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has far-reaching implications for contingency forces.
Securing lines of communication and maintaining
supply routes can be particularly difficult in urban
terrain, requiring careful planning by personnel familiar not only with military considerations but also with
the subtleties of urban planning and the management
of systems ranging from transportation to sewerage.
The combat potential and operational tempo of a maneuver force can be constrained by simple traffic jams,
markets, and other day-to-day activities of an urban
area. Enemy interdiction of supply lines is to be expected and, as recent combat experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan suggests, can be quite effective in determining battlefield initiative and success.
Megacities are often Slum Cities.
In a megacity, physical factors often become physical barriers. Most megacities have a significant number of large slums. Such areas, sometimes termed
sheet metal forests, are feral, squalid, underserviced,
and incredibly difficult both to traverse and to penetrate for information. As depicted by Davis in Planet
of Slums, life within these slums is often nasty, brutish,
and short. Potable water is nearly nonexistent, communicable diseases are often rampant, and raw sewage as well as garbage is not only strewn about but
accumulates at a dramatic rate.148 Indeed, slums such
as Kibera in Kenya, only three miles from the center
of Nairobi, or Madanpur Khadar, on the outskirts of
Delhi, have effectively been abandoned by governments. The result is a surplus of unemployed males
with little to do but join gangs or engage in crime as a
source of income. Joining extremist or terrorist organizations might also appear attractive as a way out.
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At the very least, in the event of some kind of conflict,
these young men would provide a pool of potential
recruits for those opposing the United States. In short,
slums would be an inordinately difficult battlefield.149
They would add an additional constraint, challenging
many of the traditional techniques of urban combat.
The use of heavy firepower and of tactical air support—already difficult in cities—would be reduced
even further due to population density and the flimsy
nature of slum dwellings. Ironically, given that slums
provide few of the defenses of more robust and traditional urban buildings, they could give an adversary
an even greater defensive edge.
Yet, they are also Digital Cities.
The traditional focus on urban combat has been
primarily on the terrain, with some focus on the population. However, most modern urban areas, even
those in the least developed countries, are “information rich” in terms of open-source data about the
movement of goods, people, and the infrastructure.
In a megacity, such information is drastically greater,
due to the size and density of the population and the
extent of the urban area. The sheer size and volume of
this data-rich environment could become overwhelming, leading to data overload or potential “stove piping” of information as the only way to manage it.150
Furthermore, the implications of social media and
the rapid spread of information (and disinformation)
in a highly digital city can be profound. For example,
in June 2009, a woman was shot while attempting to
peacefully demonstrate against the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections in Tehran.151 A video surfaced of the incident in which she was allegedly shot
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by a member of the pro-regime Basij militia.152 Within
hours, this video became viral, inflaming tensions and
spurring 10 days of violent protests.153 Similarly, here
in the United States, the release of videos showing
killings by police has led to significant protests and
political movements. When the battle of Mogadishu
occurred, the American public was aghast as American casualties were publicly paraded; yet, the video
quality was poor and the dissemination of the footage was rather limited. With the rapid proliferation of
mobile technology, dwellers of even the most underdeveloped megacity would be broadcasting a similar
scenario in high definition and this would be globally
disseminated within hours, if not minutes. Consequently, any mission within a megacity environment
must consider the potential benefits and pitfalls of a
digital environment that gives military activities an
unprecedented degree of transparency.
The Human Terrain.
In thinking about military contingencies in megacities and sub-megacities, the most obvious issue is the
terrain; yet, it is equally important to understand the
people—not least because they are densely packed into
a massive but still finite space.154 Operating in a hostile city is enormously difficult, as the opportunities
for ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
sabotage, the exploitation of “flash mobs,” riots and
demonstrations, and media events are infinite. If the
support of the population is a key element in insurgency and counterinsurgency, it is even more critical
in urban operations. To some extent this will depend
on the extent to which economic and social life are
respected and facilitated or disrupted and hindered.
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In this connection, one aim of the contingency force
(and this will obviously depend on the circumstances
that have led to the insertion of military forces into the
city) must be to minimize disruption on the functioning of the social and economic life of the city. Thinking
systematically beforehand about how this can best be
done is essential.
The “Mega Minefield.”
Not only do megacities compound the familiar
problems with conducting MOUT, but they also have
a higher potential for instability than smaller cities.
Therefore, problems such as civil unrest, basic infrastructure corrosion, and disease transmission will
plague the governance of such cities and play significant roles in the military operations conducted within
them. Furthermore, the extensive civilian population
can significantly bolster adversary manpower reserves, and be quickly mobilized by nonstate actors to
challenge governance of the city.155
The usual decentralization of MOUT operations
would increase dramatically in a megacity. Large geographical distances and a teeming population would
require a higher degree of decentralization in the case
of stability operations. Moreover, difficulties in traditional MOUT would be compounded by the sheer
distance and increased demands on a force attempting
military operations within a megacity or large submegacity. Maintaining secure lines of communication
and supply would be enormously difficult: not only
would underdeveloped infrastructure slow resupply
or casualty evacuation, but also the immense congestion experienced in these cities could bring such efforts
to a crawl. Enemy interdiction of supply lines would
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not only create the need for specialized equipment
and dedicated combat power, but might also cause
significant panic and spontaneous efforts at evacuation by the citizens.
Governance as a Nightmare as Well as Potential
Savior.
The sheer scale and density of megacities and submegacities ensure that such urban environments are
highly dependent on both effective governance and
access to resources not found within the confines of
the city. This has led some to compare the megacity
to the un-consumable elephant, in which addressing
the needs of the population and providing effective
governance are beyond the means of any coalition
or intervention force, at least for any protracted intervention.156 The past decade has been replete with
examples of the U.S. Army and its partners failing to
provide the necessary resources for effective governance. These have ranged from New Orleans during
Katrina, to Kandahar, Falluja, and Baghdad in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
Consequently, additional urban and megacity-specific doctrine plans should be articulated, in which
greater thought is given to the logistical and governance nightmares presented by large dense urban
environments.
However, even in the least developed of megacities,
there is a glimmer of hope for a savior. The population
and host government themselves can often mitigate if
not prevent greater calamities. A perfect example is
during the Ebola crisis, when an Ebola-infected Liberian man named Patrick Sawyer collapsed upon
arrival in Lagos, Nigeria.157 Lagos, one of the world’s
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largest megacities and often characterized as underdeveloped, fragile, and borderline feral was able to not
only get in touch with all 891 individuals potentially
exposed, but also, with aid from the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, was able react quickly.158 This was
accomplished despite the fact that the doctors of the
city were on strike. It was only possible because of the
unique nature of a megacity. As the primary economic, political, and cultural driver of a region, a megacity
is also the epicenter of many resources. Even in Nigeria, a doctor (not on strike) was able to recognize the
patient’s symptoms, impose a quarantine, and apply
proper medical precautions.159 The response reduced
the infected to only 20 individuals, with only eight
deaths in a city of 30.6 million.160
Thus, while megacities are often portrayed as significant hurdles to any military contingency operations, they also have invaluable assets that could assist in making what appears to be an overwhelming
problem seem far more manageable.161
Increased Cooperation (Inter-Service and
Inter-Agency).
More focus should also be given to operating in
megacities and sub-megacities in a “whole of government” manner. At the very least, this requires greater
cooperation with other military services and agencies.
Considering that many megacities and sub-megacities
are littoral, greater cooperation between the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps will become increasingly
important. Understanding the capabilities, needs, and
doctrine of naval operations will be crucial, therefore,
in any future operations in megacities. The inter-agency process, however, will need to go well beyond this
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and include a multitude of civilian agencies, which can
bring to bear complementary expertise and a broader
set of competences than the military acting alone.
Intelligence.
Megacities and sub-megacities should become
a distinct focus of analysis for intelligence agencies.
Understanding and anticipating developments and
events in megacities and sub-megacities will need
to become a central responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community, supplementing and at times even
surpassing both the traditional focus on states and
the more recent focus on transnational actors. At the
same time, a comprehensive picture will require multiple streams of information going beyond formal
intelligence sources. While information on network
and power structures could be obtained and updated
by the intelligence community, with infrastructure
mapping and breakdowns provided by satellite data,
much social, economic, and political insight, understanding, and even situational awareness could be obtained from non-governmental organizations. All of
this would lead to an enhanced appreciation of urban
dynamics, including patterns of flows and networks
of relationships.162 Operating effectively in megacities and sub-megacities requires an understanding of
these flows and networks and an ability to determine
when to exploit rather than disrupt their dynamics.
As discussed in the previous section, such a repository of knowledge and understanding will be essential for intelligence preparation of the battlefield
in megacity and sub-megacity military contingencies.
Moreover, this is not something that can be improvised for particular contingencies without a depth of

95

background knowledge and constant monitoring. At
the same time, once the United States is involved in a
megacity or sub-megacity contingency, then it should
make extensive use of drones, sensors (including those
inadvertently provided by citizens and adversaries),
human intelligence, and big data to provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the battle space. Given the ubiquity of cell phones even throughout much
of the developing world, as well as the growing potential for exploiting drones and sensors, most megacities
are likely to be target rich environments for technical
intelligence. Indeed, intelligence could be collected at
such a high volume that big-data processing would be
both appropriate and necessary to determine hidden
patterns and anomalies. Big data, however, would
still need to be supplemented by human intelligence.
Drones, no matter how technically complex and full
of sensors, will have great difficulty gathering intelligence within a vast urban area in which adversaries
will most certainly meet indoors. Human intelligence
assets will be able to offer far greater insight on adversaries because of their ability to capture emotions and
relationships—things that will long remain outside
the purview of even the most sophisticated drones.
Private and Public Partnerships.
Numerous private organizations already conduct
business within megacities. Many of these private
firms conduct threat assessments and intelligence
gathering. Furthermore, the necessities of conducting
business force these organizations to evaluate topics
relevant to military operations, such as crime, infrastructure, and local governance, as well as the potential for political and social unrest. In a similar fashion,

96

utilizing the large American academic community,
and to some extent the global one, could assist in obtaining data concerning key megacities. Many academics already focus on issues such as urban planning and management, human security, and economic
development—all of which are relevant to megacities
and sub-megacities. Tapping into this vast pool of research could not only reduce costs by requiring fewer
government employees, but would also increase efficiency by preventing public entities from spending
limited resources to explore topics already thoroughly
researched by academics.
Consequently, in light of the increasing constrained funding environment for the Armed Forces,
more fully developed partnerships between private
organizations and the Army can usefully be fostered.
Such partnerships, however, should be clearly defined
and structured so as to ensure that national interests
as well as the Army’s mission prevail over private
interests. These partnerships will also need to include—at least tacitly and under careful guidelines—
what might be described as non-traditional partners,
such as the criminal organizations that have enormous knowledge of cities and how they function and
would be better to have working with U.S. forces than
against them.
Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) and Partnerships.
RAF should become a cornerstone of both the
Armed Forces and the foreign policy community. In
an era of limited resources tasked with a multitude of
missions and threats, prudence would dictate an emphasis on enhanced cooperation with regional partners. In this regard, the current focus on RAF could be
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quite beneficial. Additionally, efforts should be made
to highlight such cooperation among the media, academics, and other policymakers. Doing so would both
create a greater understanding of cooperation among
the U.S. Army and allied forces, as well as foster creative and novel ideas from a broad spectrum of contributors. Increased integration and cooperation with
regional partners and collective security organizations
should also be prioritized. Whether through existing
arrangements or organizations, or through the advent
of a new organization, the U.S. military should push
for greater integration with regional partners whose
interests are convergent with those of the United
States.163
The “Equipment.”
Enhancing the combat power and intelligence
capabilities of smaller squad elements should be a
key focus for conducting operations within megacities and sub-megacities. Not only would this reduce
dependence on fire support or air power, but also it
would aid the centralized command in creating a coherent picture of the battlefield. In a similar fashion,
increased and self-contained combat power and reduced logistical needs should be pursued. If smaller
elements are able to operate independently with greater potency and little reliance on a logistical system,
then operating within megacities becomes a lot more
feasible. In the same way, larger maneuver elements
should develop capacities to deal with the myriad
of problems associated with operating in a megacity
and sub-megacity environment. Consequently, either
new equipment must be procured or current equipment should be modified for use in megacities. This
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equipment is divided into five sections: Command,
Control, Communication, and Computers (C4); Force
Protection and Projection; Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR); Logistics; and Maneuver
equipment.164
Command, Control, Communication, and Computers (C4).
Overcoming the difficulties in operating in a megacity or sub-megacity will require significant command
and control communicated in real time through highly
integrated computerized networks. Therefore, highly
reliable and secure access to communications and the
global network will be a large factor in determining
success. Equipment should be designed to ensure
intra-unit and inter-echelon communication under
all conditions, with the focus on real-time access to
needed information such as tactical intelligence and
position location. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrated that reliable C4 is a combat multiplier,
but that much equipment is outdated or requires significant maintenance. Accordingly, any future procured equipment or modifications of current equipment should focus on decreasing the weight, ensuring
reliability, and reducing the logistical requirements,
whether through longer battery life or lower dependence on other power supplies. Miniaturization of
sensors and drones, and, indeed, combinations of
these, could be particularly important here. Additionally, such command and control equipment should be
protected against disruption by increasingly technologically capable foes.
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).
Successful operations within megacities and submegacities will require real-time tactical information
and intelligence. Soldiers and battle commanders will
not only require information, but also equipment to
detect and track events and entities of interest. In conjunction with equipment that allows for actionable
intelligence, soldiers and battle commanders will not
only have a greater understanding of the battlefield,
but will be able to impact events decisively on the
ground. Increased focus on biometric technology to
identify personnel and combine that information with
actionable intelligence could pay great dividends.
Similarly, investments in language translation equipment will most certainly pay large dividends, allowing for not only enhanced ISR but also greater C4. Finally, equipment creating an enhanced battle picture
through multi-variable mapping of the political and
socio-economic planes and levels of infrastructure
will greatly enhance the capabilities and sustainability
of smaller elements and provide for the best allocation
of limited assets.
Reaching Forward and Backward.
As emphasized above, operations within megacities will require accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence. The military has previously attempted programs such as the land warrior system and instilling
a sense of each individual soldier as an intelligence
asset (so called “eyes and ears”). The benefits of such
systems create both a “reach forward” and a “reach
backward” capability. This reaching is only possible
with greater integration and synergy between both
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different command elements and numerous megacity-centric actors. Reaching forward means that individual soldiers and their accompanying equipment
(drones, GoPro cameras, land warrior-like systems)
allow battlefield commanders, urban planners, and
intelligence analysts a first-hand look onto the battlefield. For example, a soldier might not realize the significance of graffiti located on a wall, but an analyst
seeing such footage in real time will be able not only
to notify the soldier of its significance but also to compile a more accurate assessment of the situation on the
ground. Similarly, an example of reaching backward
would be a soldier requesting the services of a structural engineer to assess the structural weakness of a
building in the kinetic phase of combat, or to help find
a structural entry during a natural disaster scenario. A
shortage of interpreters, to at least some degree, could
also be overcome via reach-back sessions employing
Skype or Facetime connections with remote language
speakers.165 While some of these technologies are
readily available, at this time they are costly and cumbersome. Further research on the utility of such technology is likely to have substantial benefits.
Force Protection and Projection.
Equipment that provides protection from a range
of enemy attacks, whether in an asymmetric or a conventional urban battlefield, is critical. Defeating the
hazards of explosives should be a major focus, with
increased attention on the detection of buried objects
at standoff, out of direct line-of-sight, and over-thehorizon distances. Continued improvements in counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM), as well as
personal protective equipment with an emphasis on
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lightweight designs are vital. Counter sniper technology should also be pursued, as sniping might be
a preferred tactic amongst adversaries across a broad
spectrum of operations.
Technology enhancing the reliability of munitions
as well as the capabilities for close fire support such as
mortars should be pursued. Direct line-of-fire weaponry as well as Counter Defilade Target Engagement
(CDTE) systems such as the XM25166 should continue
to be procured. The advantages of such weapons systems in denying adversaries the use of cover while
minimizing collateral damage will be key in large
complex environments such as megacities or submegacities.
Additionally, as the battle of Sadr City in 2008
demonstrated, heavy armored units have utility in urban operations.167 Surprisingly, such heavily armored
units cause less collateral damage than other means of
fire support.168 Additionally, such vehicles are survivable and lethal, and greatly enhance the combat power
of units.169 Therefore, innovation in armored vehicles
should continue not only for maneuver warfare, but
also with urban warfare in mind. Recent modifications to existing vehicles and newer armored vehicles
such the Russian tank support combat vehicle Object
199 “Ramka”170 and the IDF armored personnel carrier
“Achzarit,”171 were designed from first-hand combat
experience in urban terrain. The U.S. Army should
also modify existing vehicles or design an armored
vehicle for the express purpose of operating in megacities and sub-megacities.

102

Logistics.
Operational sustainment in a megacity or submegacity will be intensive, requiring significant investment in technology and equipment that will enable the Army to outpace rapidly changing operational
scenarios.172 Munitions that increase combat capabilities but reduce the logistical weight of the maneuver
elements should be a major technological investment
area.173 Considering the limited infrastructure in many
megacities, bridging solutions (such as modular lightweight bridges) and the trade-offs between tracked
and wheeled must be taken into consideration. Finally,
greater priority should be given to water purification,
fuel supply, and maintenance. This is critical, because
any mission within a megacity or sub-megacity will
have significant logistical requirements, whether due
to scale, terrain, or enemy action.
Maneuver.
Equipment and technological innovation should
also focus on increasing survivability and enhancing
maneuverability of key systems and units in a megacity environment. Emphasis should be placed on increasing the capabilities and reliability of autonomous
systems, thus reducing the exposure of personnel to
enemy action. Additionally, considering both lack of
infrastructure and high levels of congestion, fuel-efficiency-enabling technologies for Army tactical and
off-road vehicles should be explored.
Furthermore, the density of many megacity environments means that vertical insertion may be the
most efficient means of entry and egress.174 As Dawn
Morrison and Collin Wood argue, the vertical nature
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of many cities offers man-made high ground.175 Benefits of such high ground include much needed standoff distance, overwatch, greater potential access to
clear communication channels, and the potential for
rapid insertion and egress, all with minimal impact
on the population.176 Therefore, investing or examining technology to maximize the benefits of such manmade high ground will prove quite beneficial and
might even restore some semblance of maneuver in
usually very constricted environments.
The “Personnel.”
Megacity and urban operations require intelligent
and talented personnel capable not only of comprehending and complying with senior leaders’ objectives, but also of gathering intelligence and understanding the dynamic relationships at play within an
urban environment. Recruiting and retaining such
quality infantrymen might be more expensive and
increasingly difficult in light of the general lack of interest in military service by many talented individuals—especially given the attractions of more lucrative,
yet safer, professions. Lawmakers and policymakers
should understand that conducting effective military
operations in urban areas requires high-quality personnel, and as such will require increased incentives
for recruitment. With many private firms offering college tuition in addition to higher wages than the military, a new incentive structure must be created and
maintained if the military is to train and sustain the
high-quality personnel needed on 21st-century urban
battlefields.
Attaining such a high-quality level of personnel
will not only require more intensive use of traditional
recruiting methods, but will also demand a revision in
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recruitment, training, and retention practices. However, as the “Pentathlete” concept and the Special Forces
Assessment and Selection system have demonstrated,
recruiting and retaining higher-quality soldiers is feasible. Furthermore, by utilizing the accrued knowledge of numerous law enforcement agencies (domestically and internationally), the U.S. Army can greatly
enhance its success in the non-kinetic battlefield environment. Although there might be criticism of such a
proposal, especially in the face of increased costs and
training duration, the benefits will be significant.
Selection and Training of Soldiers.
Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter
Schoomaker frequently championed the concept of the
“pentathlete leader,” in which an officer is equipped
with problem-solving capabilities and confidence to
respond to any situation on the battlefield.177 Similarly, former Secretary of the Army Dr. Francis J. Harvey
identified the pentathlete as “a multi-skilled leader
that personifies the warrior ethos in all aspects, from
warfighting to statesmanship to enterprise management.”178 Consequently, the concept of a pentathlete leader has been incorporated into formal Army
leadership instruction at numerous levels.179 Such a
concept should not only continue to be fostered, but
megacity-centric skills should be explicitly taught
at both the officer and enlisted levels (at least of the
non-commissioned officers), so as to meet the exceptional challenges faced within the megacity and submegacity environments.
At first, such a task might seem incredibly difficult;
yet a foundation already exists in current programs.
The first is within the Special Forces Qualification
Course (SFQC). In order to be given the opportunity to
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try the course, candidates must have already achieved
high scores on both the general technical and combat
operations sections of the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test.180 Consequently, even
before training, soldiers with a higher potential (insofar as the testing can indicate) are selected. Furthermore, in conjunction with comprehensive training and
language instruction, Army Special Forces are able to
develop formidable soldiers with multiple skills.
Given the complex nature of future conflicts, especially those within megacities, similar requirements
should be imposed on most other soldiers. All military occupation specialties (MOS) would potentially
gain from this initial pentathlete training and the more
stringent requirements it imposes. If the Army were to
choose to limit the program due to fiscal or other restraints, however, the emphasis should be on combat
MOS. They would benefit most and would be better
prepared, not only for current stabilization operations, but also for the even-more-demanding conditions likely to prevail in future megacity operations.181
Despite technological innovations, urban combat
is ultimately the domain of the infantry.182 Therefore, it requires highly trained and capable infantrymen, who are able to operate in an environment that
is not only multi-dimensional, but one in which the
opponent might have numerous advantages in cover,
concealment, and intelligence. In at least some megacities, the adversary will have far larger manpower
reserves than Army forces.183 Yet, recruiting and
maintaining a large infantry force is expensive, especially given legacy costs such as health and medical
benefits. However, as the special forces community
has demonstrated, smaller, better trained units with
greater access to resources are just as effective as—if
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not more effective than—larger forces with regard to
post-kinetic missions, such as winning the hearts and
minds of populations.
Law Enforcement Influences.
For many, the mention of megacity combat and
law enforcement conjures up the dystopian image of
the fictional character Judge Dredd.184 While lacking
the fictional power of such a figure, many law enforcement officials already tackle difficult problems facing
megacities, such as the aftermath of an earthquake in
Tokyo, or the search and seizure of a terrorist cell in
London or more recently in Paris. Many of the military contingencies outlined in this monograph have
been similar to contingencies confronting law enforcement agencies. However, while there might be some
convergence within some of the roles and operations
conducted by both, the two professions are significantly different, especially with regard to the battlefield. Yet, soldiers might find themselves in situations
in which law enforcement personnel have had a great
deal more experience and training. Joint training, with
its opportunities for insight into the types of coercion
and compliance that work at the community level,
as well as other techniques used by law enforcement
agencies, could be enormously beneficial.185
Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that
law enforcement officers with a greater education
(such as college degrees) are better at handling a large
array of different situations than their counterparts
without such qualifications.186 The implication is that
as the modern battlefield becomes more complex, especially in a potential megacity, there are significant
benefits to imposing higher educational standards on
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those specialized soldiers who will play increasingly
complex roles.
Megacity-Centric Training and Inclusion.
In addition to infantry, other personnel, such as
low-density but high-demand specialized units like
civil affairs, military police, and transportation units
should be involved in the conduct of MOUT operations. Such personnel should have backgrounds in
engineering, infrastructure reconstruction, medicine,
urban planning and design, law enforcement, and
working with big data. These personnel will be able
to tackle the less understood aspects of MOUT operations, providing basic needs and reconstruction efforts for the civilian population. A successful MOUT
operation most certainly requires security, but having
significant development and human security related
operations, in conjunction with military security, increases the likelihood of a successful outcome. As the
battle for Sadr City in 2008 demonstrated, the expertise of such personnel can have a major impact on
the battlefield by easing the hold on the population
of adversaries or by creating conditions for enhanced
governance and subsequent civilian support.187
Additionally, megacity-centric training areas will
be critical. As Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong noted,
the U.S. Army simply does not possess the live-training areas that replicate the scale required to train for a
megacity.188 They argue that while the Joint Readiness
Center’s Shughart-Gordon complex is quite useful for
squad level training, it lacks the multi-dimensional
requirements for training in a megacity.189 Given the
tough budgetary constraints it faces, the Army should
consider funding appropriate facilities through vari-
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ous other means, whether those are from public or
private ventures, or from collaboration with other interested parties.190 Such a training area would enhance
the capabilities of not only the Army but also other
federal, state, and local agencies that would provide
potential partners. Finally, other actors, primarily
those concerned with governance and stabilization
efforts, could also use such training facilities. Such actors could include law enforcement, urban planners,
aid-delivery agencies, or even potential foreign partners or host nations. Conducting training in such an
environment would greatly enhance the cooperation
and potential lessons to be learned before conducting
a mission within a megacity.
As Evans argued, “[the military planners conducting such training must in effect] assume much of the
mindset of an urban planning executive.”191 Consequently, the training conducted on such a site should
reflect the difficulties faced by many megacities and
sub-megacities. Army forces conducting stabilization
efforts have actually faced such difficulties numerous
times. These difficulties include but are not limited to:
providing electricity, sanitation, infrastructure maintenance, and other facets of everyday city governance.
As Evans observed, “if city operations are to be a
common future environment for American and allied
forces, then an urban strategic lens must be developed
. . .”192 The discussion in this monograph is intended
to contribute toward the development of such a lens.
OPERATING ON THE MEGACITY BATTLEFIELD
U.S. Armed Forces and their coalition partners,
engaged in urban combat in a dense urban area, face
far greater challenges today than in previous interven-
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tions in already complicated and dense urban environments. As emphasized throughout this analysis,
the megacity environment is highly complex and networked, and will require the Armed Forces to adapt
and operate in ways that have a high degree of accord
with the urban environment. Congruence rather than
dissonance is essential.
The urban battlefield—like all terrain in which
military operations occur—is not static, uniform, or
monolithic. Moreover, as noted above, the occupants
of a dense urban area are a major part of the terrain.
Yet, this population and any opposition combatants
will almost certainly attempt to leverage the complex
characteristics of urban areas. This section first summarizes the characteristics of urban combat, drawing
on past experiences and lessons learned from historical
cases. Then we elaborate on what is termed the “contradiction of security.” This is followed by a discussion
of potential enemy actions, as well as of the unforeseen consequences and surprising developments that
are an inevitable concomitant of military operations in
a dense and massive urban environment. This section
concludes with some future considerations.
Urban warfare has been a facet of war since humanity started to congregate into larger settlements.
Consequently, throughout most of human history,
urban combat has actually been more the rule rather
than the exception.193 From the ancient siege of Tyre
(332 BC) by Alexander the Great, to the battle of Hue
(1968) during the Vietnam War, urban conflict has
not only provided significant challenges, but has at
times also been a key to successful outcomes of many
military operations. Consequently, the dense urban
battlefield already has basic characteristics that define and constrain the combatants. These include ter-
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rain, which highly favors the defense by restricting
movement and creating funneled approaches for any
would-be attacker. This terrain, as previously noted,
is 360 degrees in scope, with subterranean, street level, and elevated buildings. Furthermore, the persistent
threat of ambushes, in conjunction with the high potential for casualties and the high expenditure of ammunition, creates significant command and logistical
difficulties. A brief look at past and potential urban
operations will help bring understanding to the inherent difficulties of operating in such a complex battle
environment.
Traditional State-on-State War.
The battles of Stalingrad (1942) and Berlin (1945)
provide vivid examples of state-on-state warfare for
major dense urban areas, both of which lead to extremely high casualties for all combatants. In the case
of Stalingrad, the defensive phase lasted 126 days and
resulted in 644,000 total Russian casualties and over
600,000 Russian refugees.194 Both of these battles ultimately resulted in the utter destruction of the dense
urban areas. A more modern scenario, which although
unlikely is by no means inconceivable, could involve a
battle in Seoul, in the Republic of Korea. In some ways,
such a scenario exemplifies the potential for a contemporary Battle of Stalingrad. The greater Seoul metropolitan area contains over 23 million people, provides an incredibly dense metropolitan environment
that has many elements of a smart city, and is critical
to the economy of South Korea. This megacity, which
faces an aggressive and unpredictable North Korea,
is only 30 miles from the demilitarized zone and, in
the event of hostilities on the peninsula, would likely
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be an immediate target of North Korean conventional
forces. The United States, bound by the Treaty to the
Republic of Korea, would be obligated to come to its
assistance. One of the advantages the United States
would have in such a contingency would be access to
detailed local knowledge of the city, its transportation
routes and networks, its flows, and its rhythms. In this
kind of traditional military conflict, such advantages
might be less important than in other contingencies
involving megacities. Whether they would be enough
to offset North Korea’s advantages in conventional
forces, therefore, remains uncertain. The more U.S.
military forces are educated, trained, and equipped
for a dense urban conflict, the more likely the numerical advantage of North Korea would not prove nearly
as decisive as Pyongyang might anticipate.
State vs. Nontraditional Actors.
In Mogadishu (1993) and Grozny (1995), the U.S.
Army and Russian Federation Army respectively underestimated non-traditional actors.195 In the case of
Mogadishu, what was intended as a quick high-value
target-capture mission instead resulted in a 17-hour
firefight, in which a large city militia attacked American forces.196 In the case of Grozny, the Russian forces
utilized deep urban penetration tactics in the hope of
seizing key infrastructure targets, but they were cutoff and destroyed. Both instances show how things
can go awry and how those entities with deeply embedded knowledge of the city and an ability to mobilize their members can offset forces that possess conventional superiority.
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The Contradictions of Security.
Any military force embroiled within a dense urban area must take into account the complexity of
networks, flows, and rhythms. The population typically works within the familiar framework these
create, establishing everyday norms and routines. If
the framework is seriously disrupted, over the longterm it can adapt, creating new, if perhaps more constrained, rhythms. In the short term, however, serious
disruptions of networks, flows, and rhythms—especially if man-made rather than the result of a natural
disaster—will create considerable antipathy in the
population toward those deemed responsible.
This creates an inevitable tension—what is described here as the contradictions of security— in that
efforts to enhance security through measures such as
erecting barriers or restricting movement would actually disrupt the flows, networks, and rhythms within
the city. In effect, the defensive measures could create forms of arrhythmia so disruptive that significant
segments of the population would be deeply alienated
and even hostile. Far from making the urban landscape safer, such efforts could actually increase the
hostility toward the intervention forces, whatever the
initial mission. Glenn noted how this might occur:
The commander drawing militarily-typical unit
boundaries along physical features such as roads, rivers, and the like will find those boundaries become
self-inflicted wounds should they not be realigned
once combat operations recede. Savvy leaders can instead minimize liaison, communications equipment,
and other demands by realigning boundaries with
existing administrative jurisdictions. It is a lesson unfortunately repeatedly learned and forgotten, two of
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the most recent instances being during the Los Angeles 1992 riots and in 2003 Baghdad. Recognizing the
importance of identifying administrative delineations,
then providing them to operational planners could
preclude yet another recurrence.197

The implication of Glenn’s analysis is that even
if military necessity requires actions that create dissonance and disruption in the city in the short term,
these impediments to the normal flows and rhythm—
whether control points or administrative hassles—
should be eliminated as soon as possible.
In addition to inadvertent arrhythmia, however,
it is also possible to conceive of the creation of arrhythmia as a deliberate strategy. Enemy forces might
well decide that causing arrhythmia in the city could
actually provide numerous tactical and strategic benefits—especially if the disruption could be specifically targeted against intervening forces—and even
more if it can be somehow blamed on these forces or
even their very presence. It is not hard to conceive,
for example, of an armed group developing a blocking
strategy that uses a coordinated approach of blocking
roads through abandoning large numbers of vehicles
in the streets that prevents access to and exits from
the U.S. military headquarters in the city. A well-coordinated initiative of this type would create enormous
difficulties for U.S. forces, especially if some of the
vehicles contained booby traps or IEDs. Even if only
a few of the vehicles contained IEDs, as long as they
were located among the first to be cleared, this would
ensure the whole clearance operation becomes much
more painstaking—and far more protracted. If such
a scenario seems far-fetched, it is worth noting that
in 2011, the Zetas Organization, a Mexican criminal
organization, attacked an Army base in Monterrey,
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and they also blocked roads to ensure that reinforcements could not quickly come to assist the soldiers in
the base. There is a risk, however, for armed groups in
such a strategy, as they could be held responsible for
disrupting the city—thereby losing considerable support. Nevertheless, this might be a risk worth taking.
Much the same is true for U.S. Armed Forces. The
worst case for the U.S. military, of course, is the imposition of strict security measures that fail to increase
security while also proving highly disruptive. Other
attempts at enhancing security might succeed in this
objective but simultaneously inhibit flows of commerce and people, thereby creating offsetting negative consequences. Such an outcome, however, is not
preordained. When implemented in conjunction with
other measures, enhanced security efforts can work,
in spite of creating short-term dislocation. An example of this was the campaign in Sadr City in 2008. U.S.
and Iraqi forces conducted an operation in which they
reduced enemy activity within the Sadr City segment
of Baghdad. The operation was a success because,
while significant forces were directed toward building physical barriers to restrict enemy movement, additional resources were directed toward some very
effective supporting operations.198 These included
a buyback program that increased the market value
of arms and ammunition beyond the capacity of the
enemy to compete, as well as measures designed to
meet the essential needs of the population behind the
walled areas.199 Some critics have argued that providing for basic needs in fact might actually spur some
people to become combatants. If young men, for example, are focused on getting their next meal or finding shelter, they will be too preoccupied to take up
arms. However, if their needs are being met, then they
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are potentially able to play a more significant role in
the conflict. There might be something to this, but it
ignores the fact that the provision of services and even
more, employment opportunities, tends to create a
degree of political support. Although not related to a
megacity, the Anbar Awakening was an excellent example of how the United States was able to outbid the
insurgents and, in that case, create its own militia.
A recognition of the dangers of a narrow approach
to security is also critical in relation to competing narratives. While the Vietnam War and the battle of Mogadishu (1993) clearly displayed the power of the traditional media, the rise of social media has added a new
and much more immediate dimension. In the digital
age, facts will often be distorted, as events are broadcast minutes after occurring, often without a context or
full picture. Such reports tend to become part of what
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt termed “the battle
of the story.”200 Presenting compelling narratives can
enhance legitimacy and authority in the eyes of many
stakeholders (such as the urban population). Understanding the utility and power of digital media, therefore, allows for enormous reach and breadth that can
indirectly alter the battlefield. The user-friendliness of
mass media and mobile technology allows adversaries to manipulate and garner favorable public opinion
and recruit support. For these reasons and more, civilian and military leaders cannot afford to ignore the
requirement for compelling narratives.
A military commander should understand, therefore, that his or her decisions and the actions of subordinates could have far larger political impact than
in the past because of digital media. This “information wake” will often be incomplete or inaccurate, but
that will not prevent it from having serious conse-
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quences. It is critical, therefore, that commanders not
only enforce strict rules of engagement, interaction,
and conduct, but also educate the lower echelons
on the impact of the digital battlefield. Furthermore,
higher echelons should comprehend that failing to
understand and engage in this battle of the narrative
might erode public support among not only those in
the dense urban area in which military operations are
being conducted, but also domestic publics and other
stakeholders globally.
In the final analysis, the battle of narratives and the
contradictions of security are likely to be at the forefront, especially as the most likely contingencies will
be humanitarian or stabilization operations. Moreover, such operations could even take place within the
continental United States, as demonstrated by the Los
Angeles riots and the responses to Hurricane Katrina
and Superstorm Sandy. Presenting a positive image of
the military to the American public is indispensable
for continued support.
Likely Enemy Actions and Potential Tactical Solutions.
In any military contingency, adversaries react
and adapt to the tactical situation on the battlefield.
Within a dense urban area such as megacity or submegacity, such reactions can be highly diverse—and
have varying degrees of success. Adversaries might
seek to minimize or reduce the benefits of U.S. technological or firepower supremacy by changing where
they operate. Alternatively, they might seek to leverage technology to their own benefit. In many developing world megacities (such as Mumbai or Cairo), the
high level of penetration of feature phones facilitates
the creation of flash mobs. The Arab Spring, especially
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in Egypt, highlighted the use of this tactic. During a
military contingency in a megacity or sub-megacity,
flash mobs could be used to hinder the maneuver of
forces, to provide distractions, and to offer cover and
concealment for an opposition group.
Choosing the place and time of battle is often critical
for military success. The dense urban battlefield is no
different. Enemy forces might exploit underserviced
and underdeveloped feral areas, go underground, or
use their knowledge of terrain to maneuver and engage on their own terms. Traditionally, adversaries
have utilized the benefits of dense urban areas. These
man-made “concrete canyons” restrict movement and
funnel attackers, thereby providing significant advantages to defensive forces. The battle of Grozny (1995)
clearly highlighted these benefits, as experienced by
the Russians when they suffered significant casualties
in their attempts at occupying the city. A traditional
solution has been simply to increase offensive firepower and essentially raze the city to the ground, thus
attempting to deny the enemy the advantages of cover
and concealment. Even in World War II, however, this
approach was flawed. The battles of Stalingrad (1942)
and Berlin (1945), in which both cities were largely destroyed, proved that even the rubble of a city is still a
significant source of cover and concealment and thus
a combat multiplier. The more modern example of
the battle of Grozny (1995) demonstrated that a much
smaller defensive force could simply melt away as the
attacker accumulated and brought to bear greater firepower. The Chechens simply relocated and, without
adequate intelligence, the Russians then inadvertently
caused civilian casualties and destroyed the infrastructure of the city.
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The IDF utilized a novel conceptual approach during the battle of Nablus in 2002; “concrete canyons”
such as streets, courtyards, and alleys were simply
circumnavigated by moving horizontally through
structures. By using explosives and other breaching
tools, the IDF was able to maintain an operational
tempo and deny the enemy the usual advantages of
urban terrain. The U.S. military also enjoyed some
success during the battle of Sadr City (2008) by utilizing heavy armored units in effective support for
sustained street fighting.201 On the other hand, during
recent operations against the IDF in dense urban areas, Hamas utilized extensive underground networks
to deny targeting and observation opportunities to
the Israelis.202 The resistance groups used an underground infrastructure to move around and maintain
its operational capacity. Such underground structures—sewer and subway systems or underground
tunnels built by illicit actors—are already part of the
fabric of many dense urban areas. Furthermore, creating such structures near critical civilian infrastructure or population centers could further add to their
utility. While numerous technological advances and
weaponry make it possible to engage and destroy such
underground networks, their continued utility and resilience will ensure their appearance in a dense urban
environment.
Many megacities and dense urban areas also contain numerous slums or “sheet metal forests,” which
are very different from “concrete canyons.” These
areas cannot be traversed easily, if at all, with heavy
armored units. Moreover, the use of heavy firepower
will be restricted because of the density of civilians,
and the inherently weak structures that are unable to
provide any effective protection. At the same time,
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these areas can provide significant concealment to adversaries, and even become strong operational bases.
Apart from moving the population out and bulldozing the slum, there is very little that can be done. In
addition, expulsion and relocation can prove difficult
even in peacetime. In September 2014, the Indian city
of Mumbai bulldozed 309 acres of slums to protect
the airport region. The displacement of 90,000 slum
dwellers, however, imposed additional resource demands on city authorities.203 Attempting something
similar during a military contingency would probably
be regarded as politically unacceptable. An alternative
would be to deal with alternate governance stakeholders, such as criminal entities, that often reside and operate in such slums and engage in both predatory and
paternalistic behavior. A tacit or explicit agreement
with the forces of alternative governance might make
it possible to prevent adversaries from utilizing these
“sheet metal forests.” Of course, there would have to
be something in return, even if only an implicit understanding that U.S. military forces would not interfere
with the illicit business of the criminal organizations.
The proliferation and democratization of drones or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) present both challenges and advantages within megacity combat zones.
While much has been written about the benefits and
drawbacks of drones, their utility in a dense urban area
is hard to dispute. Their over-the-horizon capabilities
as surveillance or weapons platforms, as well as their
capacity to loiter over the battlefield, are significant
assets. Yet, there are numerous anti-UAV defense systems (AUD) that reduce the effectiveness of drones.
One of these AUD methods includes using cyber and
technological means to hack or hijack the drone, either
seizing it or rendering it inoperable. Other techniques
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include counter-drone weaponry such as freezing
rays or radio jamming, which are being developed by
United Kingdom-based firms.204 Another AUD low
technology technique is using Dutch-trained eagles to
hunt and destroy UAVs.205 Moreover, it is only a matter of time until other states and non-traditional actors invest significantly in AUD technology. Similarly,
while micro-UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles
(UGVs) will provide added benefits on the battlefield,
countermeasures will also rapidly be devised.
Finally, the use of smaller camera systems (whether micro-drones or the GoPro variety) and global positioning system (GPS) programs will provide real-time
battlefield intelligence that could be a combat multiplier. Yet, there are limits inherent in the technology
itself. Moreover, some useful technologies have not
yet been widely adopted. For example, the Waze application provides navigation assistance and real-time
traffic updates, but is community based and has not
yet spread to the developing world. Consequently,
there is no Waze map of slums within megacities.
There are also some dangers; user-submitted data, for
example, might be subject to deliberate manipulation.
Perhaps even more important, the data flow would
likely be reduced at the very time it is most needed.
Military action would lead many of the users to flee
the area, or forget about posting data as they try to
keep themselves safe. Nevertheless, the long-term potential for such technology is considerable, as it would
offer constant updating to existing maps.
Unforeseen Actions and Unanticipated Consequences.
Unfortunately, there are always unforeseen actions and inadvertent consequences in any military
contingency. In the context of a dense urban area,
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these include human crushes, inadvertent alienation
of population segments, and a constant knowledge
gap. Human crushes often occur when large groups
of people are funneled through inadequate flow systems, and people are simply trampled to death. This
occurred on August 31, 2005, when hundreds of thousands of people converged on a pilgrimage across the
Al-Aaimmah Bridge in Baghdad.206 A mortar attack
earlier in the day hit part of the crowd, and many
of the pilgrims suspected another attack was imminent. Consequently, a man claiming he saw someone
wearing explosives triggered a panic. This caused a
rush to the bridge, which had been closed for security reasons. As security forces opened a gate, people
rushed the bridge, trampling and crushing those who
fell. At least 953 people attempting to flee across the
bridge were killed.207 Unfortunately, such events are
relatively frequent in dense urban areas in the developing world—even without military activities. They
are even more likely in combat zones and cities targeted by terrorists. Consequently, commanders and
their subordinates should be sensitive to the contradictions of security and recognize that, under some
circumstances, heightened security measures could
prove deadly—with significant media and political
repercussions.
Another dilemma arises in relation to local knowledge. It is clear that there is no substitute for local
knowledge and expertise, and unless this can somehow be co-opted by the contingency force, commanders will be operating at a major disadvantage. Consequently, attempts should be made to co-opt this
knowledge, whether through better relationships
with host governments and forces, building ties and
relationships with criminal enterprises, or utilizing
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private-public relationships. The difficulty is that such
relationships can become too exclusive and thereby
alienate other stakeholders, with both unforeseen and
unfortunate consequences in the short term and long
term.
Future Considerations.
Anticipating future combat scenarios is a formidable undertaking; there will always be knowledge
gaps, major uncertainties, and unpleasant surprises.
Sometimes there will also be indeterminate outcomes.
Nevertheless, with increasing urbanization, the likelihood of combat or at least some kind of contingency
in a megacity or sub-megacity increases. Given the
trends in urbanization, especially in the global south
and the concomitant problems of instability and fragility, it is more likely that the U.S. Army will find
itself in a fragile or feral megacity than in a smart
city. Consequently, it will have to display an unprecedented degree of sensitivity toward issues such as
alternative governance, social and political networks,
and the flows and rhythms of the city. Indeed, a willingness to make tradeoffs between enhanced security
and maintaining the mobility inherent in cities will
also be essential. Nor can the United States count on
unchallenged technological superiority, as it will have
to contend with both traditional and nontraditional
forces engaging in both imitative and offset reactions.
Moreover, the prospect of a “black swan” event or innovation that could dramatically change the dynamics
of megacity combat cannot be ruled out. Such events
or innovations play a disproportionate role, and are
hard to predict. Nevertheless, by understanding the
dynamics of a megacity and by engaging in appropriate doctrinal and technological innovation, the U.S.
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Army can develop a robust capability for operating
effectively in a megacity environment.
The impact of focusing on dense urban areas will
obviously have an impact on the U.S. military and
on the U.S. Army in particular. Through greater integration with non-kinetic stakeholders, the Army
will become more adept at tackling humanitarian and
governance issues. This will be of even broader relevance and importance—such issues have been critical in recent stabilization interventions such as in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus on governance
in dense urban areas will indirectly increase Army
expertise in stabilization efforts. Another significant
benefit for the Army will be the integration of nontraditional technologies and tactics, such as the use
of social media and law enforcement techniques as
additional mechanisms of political leverage.
CONCLUSION
Urbanization will most certainly continue at a significant pace, resulting in cities becoming ever more
important politically and economically. The likelihood, therefore, is that cities will become more important strategically, and that the United States will
find itself, at some point in the not-too-distant future,
engaged in military contingencies in large cities. It is
imperative, therefore, that political and military leaders in the United States understand the intricacies of
the interlinked systems that compose dense urban
areas and are able to leverage that understanding
into battlefield success. The U.S. Army can be better
prepared for the dense urban battlefield than ever before through: a conceptual understanding of megacities and sub-megacities; an institutionally embedded
system of intelligence collection and analysis for the
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urban battlefield; innovations in doctrine, equipment,
and training; and an appreciation of likely scenarios
and adversary actions. Inherent and unforeseen challenges will remain. Indeed, it is important to keep in
mind the cautionary note articulated by Barry Posen,
who observed that:
combat of any kind in an urban environment is very
difficult. A skilled, reasonably well armed, adversary
with a few thousand good and committed infantry can
probably impose very significant costs on even a very
competent Western military force. Military operations
in urban areas should thus be avoided to the extent
possible.208

Such cautions notwithstanding, an inhibition cannot
be allowed to become a prohibition. If there is a highly
compelling strategic rationale for action, the United
States might not have the luxury of avoiding the dangers of an urban contingency. Consequently, it needs
to be as prepared as possible, in terms of knowledge,
equipment, training, and tactics. This is reflected in
the following recommendations.
Key Findings and Recommendations:
• As megacities and sub-megacities take on increasing salience and importance in the next
few decades, they should become a distinct focus of analysis for intelligence. Understanding
and anticipating developments and events in
dense urban areas will need to become a central responsibility of the U.S. intelligence community, supplementing and at times even surpassing both the traditional focus on states and
the more recent focus on transnational actors.
Cities have to be understood as a layered and
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interacting series of complex adaptive systems,
outlined with a more refined intelligence of and
for the battlefield. Operating in these cities requires an understanding of these systems and
an ability to harness rather than disrupt their
dynamics.
• Developing a repository of knowledge and
understanding of these cities is a critical component of IPB in megacity and sub-megacity
military contingencies. Moreover, this is not
something that can be improvised for particular contingencies without a depth of background knowledge and understanding. Given
all this, it is critical that the U.S. Army create an
Urban Analysis Center and a supporting network that provides a surge capability for crisis
interventions.
• Greater cooperation among the armed services
themselves is essential for any operations in
megacities or sub-megacities. This requirement will be quite demanding and could all
too easily lead to inter-service turf wars, particularly if the Army envisages combat operations in littoral urban areas, traditionally the
preserve of the Marine Corps. Not only is cooperation among the armed services essential,
but civilian government agencies (including
the Department of State and the U.S. Agency
for International Development) as well as law
enforcement agencies will also have key roles
to play. Their involvement is essential for
success.
• It will also be necessary to interact with both
the formal and informal mechanisms of governance within megacities and sub-megacities.
This may involve cooperating with non-tradi126

tional stakeholders such as criminal elements
or other alternative governance actors.
• Once the United States is involved in a dense
urban contingency, then it should make extensive use of equipment and tactics that leverage
American as well as coalition advantages and
that reduce the capabilities of likely adversaries. This equipment should include drones,
reach-back and reach-forward technologies
(Skype, GoPro cameras, and components of a
land-warrior type system), and appropriate logistics and maneuver technology.
• Conducting operations in megacities, as well as
other urban areas, will require highly trained,
quality personnel. The armed services will
have to increase incentives to draw talented individuals to serve. It will also be necessary to
incorporate recruits and affiliates with broader
skill sets, especially those required for urban
management and urban law enforcement.
These initiatives will need to be complemented
by in-house training for professional soldiers to
prepare them more effectively for the demands
of operating in complex urban environments.
• Recognize that there are synergies—and important economies of scale—between the skill sets
required for operating in dense urban areas and
those appropriate for stabilization operations.
Finally, this monograph proposes two broad checklist-based acronyms defined below—URBAN and
SMART—that encapsulate many of the arguments
and themes articulated in the preceding analysis. To
fight effectively in a dense urban environment, the
U.S. Army will have to meet the following requirements and approaches:
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• Understanding the megacity battlefield;
• Responding appropriately to the stringent
demands of the urban battlefield;
• Battle management that is accommodating to
the city’s rhythms, flows, and networks;
• Alliances that go beyond government agencies
and the usual partners; and,
• Novel approaches that are essential to creating
the smart urban soldier.
Moreover, within this urban approach the smart soldier would exhibit the following qualities:
• Sophisticated understanding of the urban
battlefield;
• Multimedia and social media awareness;
• Ability to act as intelligence collectors and
receivers;
• Rapid responses both within the command
system and in decentralized operations; and,
• Technological knowledge and expertise.
Ultimately, fighting smart in an urban environment is the only feasible approach. This monograph
has offered some preliminary considerations of what
this might mean. Yet, it has obviously raised more
questions than it has answered and can be no more
than an early contribution to a debate that needs to
be broadened and refined. Only after such a debate
will the United States be ready for future contingencies that are likely to be as challenging as they are
inescapable.
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